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Abstract 
 
 This research explores forecasting techniques to estimate the Cost per Flying 
Hour for Air Force Helicopters.  Specifically, this research evaluates three separate 
forecasting techniques to predict the CPFH for better estimating and budgeting by the 
USAF.  It starts by empirically analyzing the Operating and Support cost by CAIG 
categories for each helicopter.  For forecasting purposes the actual CPFH figures were 
compiled from FY96 to FY03 for a total of eight MAJCOMs flying the MH-53J/M, the 
HH-60G, or the UH-1N helicopters.  The research explores the use of a 3-year moving 
average, the single exponential smoothing method, and the Holt’s linear method.  These 
forecasting techniques were used to forecast for FY02 in evaluating the best methodology 
to forecast the CPFH for FY04.  By comparing both the budgeted and forecasted figures 
for FY00 to FY02 to the actual CPFH figures in the same years, the forecasting methods 
were able to more accurately predict the actual CPFH for all of the MAJCOMs that 
achieved a budget variance of less than 20 percent.  It was discovered that the Holt’s 
linear method was the best forecasting method for 75 percent of the time series analyzed 
since they contained positive trends.  Finally, these techniques were employed to provide 
the best possible forecast of the CPFH for FY04. 
 
 v
Acknowledgements 
 
 
 
 
 
 I would like to thank Maj Michael Greiner, my thesis advisor, for all the direction, 
guidance, and time that he gave during this research.  His experience in the thesis process 
was an invaluable asset that diffused several potential stressful situations.  I would also 
like to thank my committee members, Lt Col Marvin Arostegui, and Ms Krystyna 
Kolesar.  They both have given generously of their time, and their insight and guidance 
has also helped shape the direction and content of this research. 
 I would also like to thank my thesis team members, Capt Christopher Wilkes and 
Lt Clay Hawkins, for making this team situation not only work, but making it excel.  I am 
also grateful to the many professionals who have given their assistance to include Capt 
Christopher Purvis, Ms. Annette Beard, Mr. Dave Flamand, Mr. Ray Scheuring, Mr. 
Thom Brown, Mr. Ron Vorhis, Dr. Freda Stroher, and Ms. Donna Ericson. 
I thank God, the Air Force, and my family for giving me the opportunity to be an 
AFIT student.  I especially thank my wife for her patience, understanding, and for 
providing an environment that has allowed me to achieve academic success.   
 
                                                                        Matthew E. Laubacher 
 vi
Table of Contents 
                   Page     
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iv 
 
Acknowledgements............................................................................................................. v 
 
List of Figures .................................................................................................................... ix 
 
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... xi 
 
I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 
 
Background..................................................................................................................... 1 
Problem........................................................................................................................... 2 
Research Questions/Objectives....................................................................................... 3 
Summary of Current Knowledge .................................................................................... 4 
Scope and Limitations..................................................................................................... 5 
Standards......................................................................................................................... 6 
Approach/Methodology .................................................................................................. 6 
Organization.................................................................................................................... 8 
 
II. Literature Review........................................................................................................... 9 
 
Chapter Overview ........................................................................................................... 9 
Introduction..................................................................................................................... 9 
History of O&S Initiative.............................................................................................. 13 
Major O&S Guidance ................................................................................................... 15 
Title 10. ..................................................................................................................... 15 
DoD 5000.4-M – O&S Costs.................................................................................... 16 
Operating and Support Cost Estimating Guide......................................................... 17 
DoD 5000.4-M – Establishment of Visibility and Management of Support Costs and 
Air Force Total Ownership Costs. ............................................................................ 20 
HH-60G Pave Hawk ..................................................................................................... 21 
MH-53J/M Pave Low III/IV ......................................................................................... 22 
UH-1N Helicopter......................................................................................................... 23 
Background of the Cost Per Flying Hour Program....................................................... 24 
Past Research ................................................................................................................ 26 
Trends in Weapon System Operating and Support Costs. ........................................ 26 
Attack Helicopters. ............................................................................................... 27 
Observation Helicopters........................................................................................ 31 
Utility Helicopters................................................................................................. 34 
Attack Helicopters: AH-1s vs. AH-64A. .............................................................. 37 
Utility Helicopters: UH-1H vs. UH-60A. ............................................................. 38 
 vii
Page 
 
Parametric Cost Modeling for Navy Aircraft. .......................................................... 40 
Parametric Cost Modeling for Air Force Aircraft..................................................... 43 
O&S Cost Reduction – U.S. Navy............................................................................ 45 
Assessing Competitive Strategies for the Joint Strike Fighter.................................. 47 
Air Force Flying Hour Program – Historical Problems............................................ 49 
Cost Per Flying Hour Calculation............................................................................. 51 
Army Flying Hour Program Methodology – Historical Problems ........................... 54 
Chapter Summary ......................................................................................................... 57 
 
III. Methodology............................................................................................................... 58 
 
Chapter Overview ......................................................................................................... 58 
Database........................................................................................................................ 58 
Empirical O&S Breakout.............................................................................................. 60 
Actual Cost Per Flying Hour Versus Budget Submissions........................................... 61 
Forecasting Options ...................................................................................................... 62 
Actual Cost Per Flying Hour Versus the Forecast ........................................................ 66 
Forecasting For FY04 ................................................................................................... 66 
Chapter Summary ......................................................................................................... 66 
 
IV.  Results and Discussion .............................................................................................. 68 
 
Chapter Overview ......................................................................................................... 68 
MH-53J/M Pave Low III/IV ......................................................................................... 68 
Empirical O&S Breakout.......................................................................................... 68 
Actual CPFH vs. Budgeted Submissions.................................................................. 70 
Forecasting Options .................................................................................................. 70 
Actual CPFH vs. Forecasted ..................................................................................... 71 
Forecasting for FY04 ................................................................................................ 72 
UH-1N Helicopter......................................................................................................... 72 
AETC – Empirical O&S Breakout ........................................................................... 73 
AETC – Actual CPFH vs. Budgeted Submissions ................................................... 74 
AETC – Forecasting Options.................................................................................... 74 
AETC – Actual CPFH vs. Forecasted....................................................................... 75 
AETC – Forecasting for FY04.................................................................................. 75 
AMC – Empirical O&S Breakout............................................................................. 76 
AMC – Actual CPFH vs. Budgeted Submissions..................................................... 77 
AMC – Forecasting Options ..................................................................................... 77 
AMC – Actual CPFH vs. Forecasted........................................................................ 78 
AMC – Forecasting for FY04................................................................................... 79 
PACAF – Empirical O&S Breakout ......................................................................... 79 
PACAF – Actual CPFH vs. Budgeted Submissions................................................. 80 
PACAF – Forecasting Options ................................................................................. 81 
 viii
Page 
 
PACAF – Actual CPFH vs. Forecasted .................................................................... 82 
PACAF – Forecasting for FY04 ............................................................................... 82 
HH-60G Pave Hawk ..................................................................................................... 83 
AETC – Empirical O&S Breakout ........................................................................... 83 
AETC – Actual CPFH vs. Budgeted Submissions ................................................... 84 
AETC – Forecasting Options.................................................................................... 84 
AETC – Actual CPFH vs. Forecasted....................................................................... 85 
AETC – Forecasting for FY04.................................................................................. 86 
ACC – Empirical O&S Breakout.............................................................................. 86 
ACC – Actual CPFH vs. Budgeted Submissions...................................................... 87 
ACC – Forecasting Options ...................................................................................... 88 
ACC – Actual CPFH vs. Forecasted......................................................................... 88 
ACC – Actual CPFH vs. Forecasted......................................................................... 89 
ACC – Forecasting for FY04.................................................................................... 89 
AFRC – Empirical O&S Breakout ........................................................................... 89 
AFRC – Actual CPFH vs. Budgeted Submissions ................................................... 90 
AFRC – Forecasting Options.................................................................................... 91 
AFRC – Actual CPFH vs. Forecasted....................................................................... 92 
AFRC – Forecasting for FY04.................................................................................. 92 
PACAF – Empirical O&S Breakout ......................................................................... 92 
PACAF – Actual CPFH vs. Budgeted Submissions................................................. 93 
PACAF – Forecasting Options ................................................................................. 93 
PACAF – Actual CPFH vs. Forecasted .................................................................... 95 
PACAF – Forecasting for FY04 ............................................................................... 95 
Chapter Summary ......................................................................................................... 95 
 
V. Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 97 
 
Problem Revisited......................................................................................................... 97 
Limitations .................................................................................................................... 97 
Summary of Literature Review..................................................................................... 98 
Review of the Methodology.......................................................................................... 99 
Restatement of Results.................................................................................................. 99 
Recommendations....................................................................................................... 102 
Possible Follow-on Theses ......................................................................................... 103 
 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 104 
 
 ix
List of Figures 
Figure               Page 
 
Figure 1.  Nominal Cost Distribution ................................................................................. 1 
 
Figure 2.  Program Life Cycle (Illustrative) ..................................................................... 10 
 
Figure 3.  DoD Annual Budget and O&M Funding ......................................................... 12 
 
Figure 4.  Aircraft Total Ownership/Life Cycle Cost Composition (20).......................... 14 
 
Figure 5.  HH-60Gs Over Naval Air Station Fallon, Nevada (21) ................................... 21 
 
Figure 6.  MH-53J Deploying Flares (21) ........................................................................ 22 
 
Figure 7.  UH-1N over Yokota Air Base, Japan  (21) ...................................................... 23 
 
Figure 8.  Attack Helicopters ............................................................................................ 28 
 
Figure 9.  Attack Helicopter O&S Cost Ratio Changes.................................................... 29 
 
Figure 10.  Observation Helicopters Total Resource and Performance Changes............. 32 
 
Figure 11.  Observation Helicopter O&S Cost Ratio Changes......................................... 32 
 
Figure 12.  Utility Helicopter Total Resource and Performance Changes ....................... 35 
 
Figure 13.  Utility Helicopter O&S Cost Ratio Changes.................................................. 35 
 
Figure 14.  ACC HH-60G O&S COSTS .......................................................................... 61 
 
Figure 15.  MH-53J/M Total O&S Costs.......................................................................... 69 
 
Figure 16.  MH-53J/M Pave Low III/IV CPFH................................................................ 70 
 
Figure 17.  UH-1N AETC O&S Costs.............................................................................. 73 
 
Figure 18.  UH-1N AETC CPFH...................................................................................... 74 
 
Figure 19.  UH-1N AMC O&S Costs............................................................................... 76 
 
Figure 20.  UH-1N AMC CPFH....................................................................................... 78 
 
Figure 21.  UH-1N PACAF O&S Costs ........................................................................... 80 
 
 x
Page 
 
Figure 22.  UH-1N PACAF CPFH ................................................................................... 81 
 
Figure 23.  HH-60G AETC O&S Costs............................................................................ 84 
 
Figure 24.  HH-60G AETC CPFH.................................................................................... 85 
 
Figure 25.  HH-60G ACC O&S Costs.............................................................................. 87 
 
Figure 26.  HH-60G ACC CPFH...................................................................................... 88 
 
Figure 27.  HH-60G AFRC O&S Costs............................................................................ 90 
 
Figure 28.  HH-60G AFRC CPFH.................................................................................... 91 
 
Figure 29.  HH-60G PACAF O&S Costs ......................................................................... 93 
 
Figure 30.  HH-60G PACAF CPFH ................................................................................. 94 
 xi
List of Tables 
Table               Page 
Table 1.  Department of Defense- Budget Authority by Appropriation Table................. 11 
 
Table 2.  Attack Helicopter Data ...................................................................................... 28 
 
Table 3.  Attack Helicopter Modernization & Annual O&M Costs ................................. 30 
 
Table 4.  Observation Helicopter Data ............................................................................. 31 
 
Table 5.  Observation Helicopter Modernization & Annual O&M Costs ........................ 33 
 
Table 6.  Utility Helicopter Data....................................................................................... 34 
 
Table 7.  Utility Helicopter Modernization & Annual O&M Costs ................................. 36 
 
Table 8.  O&S Costs and Characteristics for Attack Helicopters ..................................... 37 
 
Table 9.  O&S Costs and Characteristics for Utility Helicopters ..................................... 39 
 
Table 10.  Level 1 CAIG Data .......................................................................................... 59 
 
Table 11.  Level 1 CAIG Data, Cost per Operating Hour ................................................ 60 
 
Table 12.  MH-53J/M Budget Variances.......................................................................... 70 
 
Table 13.  MH-53J/M Evaluation Measures..................................................................... 71 
 
Table 14.  MH-53J/M Forecasted Variances .................................................................... 72 
 
Table 15.  AETC UH-1N Budget Variances .................................................................... 74 
 
Table 16.  AETC UH-1N Evaluation Measures ............................................................... 75 
 
Table 17.  AETC UH-1N Forecasted Variances............................................................... 75 
 
Table 18.  AMC UH-1N Budget Variances...................................................................... 77 
 
Table 19.  AMC UH-1N Evaluation Measures................................................................. 78 
 
Table 20.  AMC UH-1N Forecasted Variances ................................................................ 79 
 
Table 21.  PACAF UH-1N Budget Variances .................................................................. 80 
 xii
Page 
 
Table 22.  PACAF UH-1N Evaluation Measures............................................................. 82 
 
Table 23.  PACAF UH-1N Forecasted Variances ............................................................ 82 
 
Table 24.  AETC HH-60G Budget Variances .................................................................. 84 
 
Table 25.  AETC HH-60G Evaluation Measures ............................................................. 85 
 
Table 26.  AETC HH-60G Forecasted Variances............................................................. 86 
 
Table 27.  ACC HH-60G Budget Variances..................................................................... 87 
 
Table 28.  ACC HH-60G Evaluation Measures................................................................ 88 
 
Table 29.  ACC HH-60G Forecasted Variances............................................................... 89 
 
Table 30.  AFRC HH-60G Budget Variances .................................................................. 90 
 
Table 31.  AFRC HH-60G Evaluation Measures ............................................................. 91 
 
Table 32.  AFRC HH-60G Forecasted Variances............................................................. 92 
 
Table 33.  PACAF HH-60G Budget Variances ................................................................ 93 
 
Table 34.  PACAF HH-60G Evaluation Measures........................................................... 94 
 
Table 35.  PACAF HH-60G Forecasted Variances .......................................................... 95 
 
 
 
 1
ANALYSIS AND FORECASTING OF AIR FORCE OPERATING AND 
SUPPORT COST FOR ROTARY AIRCRAFT 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Background 
 The cost of operations and support (O&S) activities has become increasingly 
important in recent years due to shrinking budgets, aging aircraft, and the cost of 
maintaining newer, more technologically advanced weapon systems.  O&S costs include 
“All personnel, equipment, supplies, software, services, including contract support, 
associated with operating, modifying, maintaining, supplying, training, and supporting a 
defense acquisition program in the DoD inventory” (1:49).  O&S costs are one of the four 
main cost categories that constitute the life cycle cost of a weapon system.  The other 
three cost categories are Research and Development (R&D), Investment, and Disposal.  
O&S costs constitute the majority of the total life cycle cost for aircraft, see Figure 1 
below.  
Figure 1.  Nominal Cost Distribution 
      Life Cvcle Cost     
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 Controlling life cycle costs for weapon systems is a major issue for the 
Department of Defense (DoD).  The military must do more with less.  O&S costs are 
rising and have become a very large portion of the Air Force’s budget.  Increases to O&S 
costs limit budget requests for new weapons systems development, modernization, and 
infrastructure.  O&S costs consist primarily of operations and maintenance (O&M) and 
military personnel (MILPERS) appropriations.  In an August 2001 report, the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) reported that approximately 37 percent of the DoD’s 
budget goes to support the O&M costs for military weapon systems (2:1).  The costs will 
continue to rise as weapon systems become older and more antiquated. 
 Managers and cost analysts must pay increased attention to the trends in cost 
management.  A view involving the total life-cycle cost must be adopted; an incomplete 
perspective that only includes the costs of development and production is no longer 
acceptable.  More accurate estimating will lead to better budgeting, reduction in total 
ownership costs, and improved fiscal responsibility.  As today’s aircraft age the cost of 
maintaining the equipment will increase to unprecedented levels.  This research will 
examine O&S costs for Air Force rotary aircraft in an effort to develop forecasts for 
future cost per flying hour (CPFH).   The research conducted and model developed will 
prove valuable in the overall aim to reduce the Air Force’s total ownership costs of 
current and future rotary aircraft weapon systems. 
 
Problem 
 A discrepancy has arisen in the past several years between submissions the 
services have provided in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) during the out-
 3
years and the actual expenditures reported for CPFH programs. The Office of the 
Secretary of Defense/Cost Analysis Improvement Group (OSD/CAIG) requests the 
development of a measurement tool to analyze the validity of the services’ submissions 
effectively.  Forecasting models for CPFH are necessary for all aircraft within each 
service.   The aim of this research will be to develop a model that accurately forecasts 
future CPFH for Air Force rotary aircraft.  The ultimate goal will be to give the 
OSD/CAIG a useful tool with which to compare the services projections against 
independent analyses in expectations of forecasting and possibly controlling future O&S 
costs. 
 
Research Questions/Objectives 
 The following research questions and objectives are addressed in the body of the 
thesis: 
1. Primary:   
• To provide OSD/CAIG with a useful tool to forecast CPFH for Air Force 
rotary aircraft. 
2. Secondary: 
• For the weapons systems being studied, what are the forecasted CPFH for 
fiscal year 2004? 
• How do the forecasted figures of FY00-FY02 compare to the POM 
submissions in the same years? 
• To what extent did the POM submissions deviate from actual CPFH 
figures in FY00-FY02?  
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• What are the major O&S cost drivers, by MAJCOM, for each weapons 
system? 
 
Summary of Current Knowledge 
 The services believe that the increase in total O&M costs is mainly attributable to 
the escalating costs for aging equipment (2:1).  O&S costs consist of O&M plus the cost 
of military personnel.  Therefore, escalating O&M costs would directly increase O&S 
funding levels.  The aforementioned study conducted by the Congressional Budget Office 
indicates that increased O&M spending is not a direct result of aging equipment.  O&M 
spending includes diverse cost categories such as costs for health care, environmental 
programs, real property maintenance, and base operating support.  Although the report 
does not support the contention that the increase in O&M costs is due to aging 
equipment, evidence exists that aircraft become more costly to maintain as the aircraft 
age.  For example, Navy aircraft spending could escalate by $40 million to $130 million 
per year in a yearly O&M budget of $23 billion (2:2).  Because O&M costs constitute a 
large portion of O&S costs, O&S CPFH will more than likely accelerate in the future.   
 The CBO study suggests average aircraft age has increased slightly over the past 
two decades.  Cumulative O&M spending per hour has increased but not significantly so.  
The study differs from the services’ perspective in that the services suggest that O&M 
costs for aging equipment are spiraling out of control.  According to the CBO, only 20 
percent of O&M spending is directly dependent on equipment.  The report states, “CBO’s 
findings are in conflict with the services’ statements that spending on O&M for 
equipment is growing rapidly.  Those statements are sometimes based on selective data” 
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(2:9).  The study indicates that aircraft, including rotary, are the only weapon systems 
that have increased in average age; however, none of the weapon systems have 
experienced notable O&M cost growth over the past couple of decades (2:8). 
 The CBO report surmises that costs for operating equipment may indeed increase 
as the weapon systems age but that cost may be paid for with other appropriations not 
including O&M funding.  The sources that fund O&S costs include the following: 
operation and maintenance, military personnel, procurement, military construction, stock 
funds, and other appropriations (1:49).  The rising costs could be attributed to higher 
personnel costs due to increased maintenance for modifications to equipment paid for 
with procurement funds (2:20).    Thus, even though the CBO does not agree that weapon 
systems O&M costs are rising mainly due to aging equipment, the services’ contention 
that O&S costs are rapidly increasing for aging equipment remains valid because O&S 
costs are funded by other appropriations besides O&M money. 
 More research needs to be conducted for cross-service studies to address cost 
growth and the relationship between cost growth and age.  This thesis will address the 
O&S CPFH for rotary aircraft within the Air Force.  Trends over time will provide 
answers to whether or not CPFH has increased substantially by aircraft type and as a 
whole.  Trends will be forecasted to provide the OSD/CAIG with a yardstick to measure 
against Air Force rotary aircraft CPFH budget submissions for the POM out-years. 
 
Scope and Limitations 
 This research will develop a forecasting model useful in predicting trends in 
CPFH for AF rotary aircraft.  At the same time this research is being conducted similar 
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research efforts will be conducted for the Army and Navy.  Hawkins examines the O&S 
CPFH for Army rotary aircraft.  Wilkes investigates O&S CPFH for Navy rotary aircraft. 
The results from all three theses will provide the OSD/CAIG with an effective tool to 
measure against the services’ POM submissions and the results will give the CAIG a 
better understanding of the services’ rotary aircraft CPFH.   
  
Standards 
 In developing an accurate projection of future events, models must be constructed 
that utilize certain relationships inherent within a system.  In the case of forecasting, 
historical data can be analyzed and relationships between time series data can be used to 
develop models that suggest increasing or decreasing trends.  Certain standards will be 
utilized to obtain the best forecasting or predictive model.  Chapter three will address 
these standards such as mean error, variances, and other useful statistical performance 
measures. 
 
Approach/Methodology 
 Each service tracks O&S costs for rotary aircraft.  The Navy was the first service 
to implement a database responsible for presenting all O&S cost information for weapon 
systems.  The Navy database is called the Visibility and Management of Operating and 
Support Costs (VAMOSC).  The Army and Air Force created similar systems of their 
own for reporting O&S cost information.  The Army’s version of the VAMOSC is the 
Operating and Support Management Information System (OSMIS).  The Air Force 
named their system the Air Force Total Ownership Costs (AFTOC) database.  The 
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AFTOC system will be used extensively to extract O&S cost information for Air Force 
rotary aircraft.  
 The AFTOC database will be used to sort O&S cost information by rotary aircraft 
model and MAJCOM for each year.  The first step is to analyze the data to determine 
how the costs are broken out according to the cost element structure (CES) of O&S costs 
described in the O&S Cost Estimating Guide.  The results will indicate any trends in 
recent years.  Additionally, the data will identify any components that may significantly 
increase as a percentage of the overall cost.  Any change in the CES cost composition 
will be addressed to decide if the change is model specific or if the trend subsists in all 
models of rotary aircraft.    
 The next step involves collecting the cost per flying hour (CPFH) for each of the 
rotary aircraft types for each year.  The Government Accounting and Finance System 
(GFAS) contains all rotary aircraft information during the years 1996-2002.  This data 
will then be compared to the POM submissions in the same year to show any variances 
that exists between the actual CPFH and the budgeted CPFH. 
 Next the actual CPFH data from the previous step will be employed in developing 
a predictive model for forecasting CPFH for rotary aircraft.  The model will capture any 
trends within the cost data.  The model will help defend the CAIG’s position if a future 
disconnect arises between the services’ submissions and OSD/CAIG’s in-house 
estimates. 
 After developing a robust model useful for providing future CPFH forecasts, the 
forecasted CPFH will be compared to the actual CPFH to show any variances present.  
These variances will be compared to the budget variances.  The CAIG can compare its 
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estimates to the model to decide if any revisions are needed in the current CAIG 
forecasting process.  The final step of the research will be using the model developed for 
each MAJCOM to forecast the CPFH for FY04. 
 
Organization 
 This thesis is divided into five chapters.  Chapter one provides background 
information on the importance of accurate O&S cost estimation.  A brief description of 
the problem and research questions/objectives is given.  Then the scope, limitations, and 
methodology portions are introduced.  Chapter two presents more detailed background 
information on O&S costs and CPFH.  Past research is analyzed to provide the reader 
with a historic look at the research that has been previously completed.  Chapter three 
describes the methods used to answer the research questions presented.  The findings and 
results of this research are given in chapter four.  Chapter five provides a summary and 
conclusion based upon the analyses performed; and finally, recommendations for future 
research are offered.   
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II. Literature Review 
 
Chapter Overview 
 
This literature review provides a background into estimating Operating and 
Support (O&S) costs and the Cost Per Flying Hour (CPFH) program.  It explains the 
regulations that dictate O&S costs estimating, describes the CPFH program, describes the 
mission and current Air Force inventory of the helicopters being studied for this research, 
and finally, covers past research in this area.  This literature review explains what is 
required by law and by the regulations governing O&S costs and the CPFH program, and 
also explains the origin and requirements of the Visibility and Management of Operating 
and Support Costs (VAMOSC) database used in this research to forecast future years 
CPFH for the specific weapons systems being studied. 
 
Introduction 
 The life-cycle cost for a Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) 
encompasses the combined costs for a weapon system from the Mission Need Statement 
(MNS) through disposal and deactivation. In recent years, decision makers within DoD in 
recent years have increasingly emphasized projecting realistic O&S costs.  This initiative 
to estimate costs realistically results from escalating outflows for aging systems and the 
need for newer, more technologically sound weapons in an unprecedented era of rapid 
deployment and global terrorism.  The ability to plan for precise life-cycle costs has 
become more crucial because of increased scrutiny involving oversight of funds and 
competition for scarce resources.  O&S costs represent the largest portion of the total life-
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cycle cost.  Figure 2 illustrates a typical breakout of the life-cycle costs for a typical 
weapon system. 
 
Figure 2.  Program Life Cycle (Illustrative)1 
 
 The Department of Defense (DoD) will spend billions of dollars on force 
modernization in the post September 11 timeframe.  Although the Bush administration 
has increased the defense budget, the military still faces an uphill battle to produce 
cutting edge technology.  Military men and women must remain vigilant in all areas of 
defense budgeting.  The cost analyst can make significant contributions by accurately 
forecasting O&S costs.  The overall defense budget has shrunk since the Cold War and 
consequently, the military must do more with less.  Table 1 shows the DoD Budget 
Authority by Appropriation figures for the total budget and the O&M portion of the 
budget.  
 
                                                 
1 Figure 2-1 is taken from the OSD CAIG Operating And Support Cost-Estimating Guide (Ref 6).  The 
figure is used for illustrative purposes only.  Actual program results may vary. 
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Table 1.  Department of Defense- Budget Authority by Appropriation Table2 
Fiscal Year Current $ Constant FY03 O&M Current $ O&M Constant % of O&M Growth O&M %
(Billions) $ (Billions) (Billions) $ (Billions) (FY03 Constant $) of DoD Budget
1985 286.802 461.666 77.803 126.827 - 27.47%
1990 292.999 405.421 88.309 123.188 - 30.39%
1998 258.583 294.567 97.215 110.484 2.5 37.51%
1999 278.595 309.988 104.992 116.663 5.6 37.63%
2000 290.534 315.183 108.776 118.479 1.6 37.59%
2001 309.948 326.385 115.758 121.259 2.3 37.15%
2002 329.878 337.195 127.668 130.241 7.4 38.62%
2003 378.624 378.624 150.444 150.444 15.5 39.73%  
 In 1985, the DoD budget totaled approximately $462 billion (FY03 constant 
dollars).  The 1985 total exceeds FY03 by almost $84 billion.  The overall budget has 
decreased in terms of FY03 constant dollars from 1985 to 2003, but the amount of O&M 
funding has increased during this period.  O&S costs consist mainly of O&M and 
military personnel (MILPERS) appropriations.  The percentage of O&M funding out of 
the total budget increased from 27.5% in 1985 to nearly 40% in 2003.  The percent of 
real cost growth in O&M funding increased 15.5% from 2002 to 2003.  Thus, O&M has 
become a substantial part of the defense budget.  Therefore, accurate predictions for 
O&M cost estimates, including O&M estimates for Cost Per Flying Hour (CPFH) is 
imperative.  Figure 3 depicts the budget trends graphically.  The DoD total budget 
exhibits an upward trend but increases at a slower pace during the 1980s.  O&M costs 
show a steady increase in the overall trend. 
                                                 
2Actual results taken from the Appendix A budget tables from Donald H. Rumsfeld’s Annual Report to the 
President and the Congress (Ref 11). 
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Figure 3.  DoD Annual Budget and O&M Funding 
 When looking at the initial cost of procuring a weapon system, the acquisition 
professional must not focus solely on the cost to produce the weapon system, but instead 
must look at the entire spectrum of costs.  The sustainment portion of the life-cycle cost 
constitutes the major apportionment of funding.  This thesis concentrates specifically on 
examining the CPFH distribution of O&S costs for Air Force rotary aircraft.  The rotary 
wing aircraft within the Air Force arsenal are: 
• HH-60G Pave Hawk 
• MH-53J/M Pave Low III/IV 
• UH-1N Helicopter 
Forecasting tools will be applied to predict O&S CPFH for Air Force rotary wing aircraft.  
The projections will serve the cost estimating community at the OSD/CAIG level with 
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more defined CPFH data.  The OSD/CAIG analysts will then possess the tools to identify 
any discrepancies with future estimates provided in the program objective memorandum 
(POM) estimates submitted by the services. 
  
History of O&S Initiative 
 The DoD realizes the significant impact of O&S costs on its budget.  The first 
efforts to track and control these costs began with the Visibility and Management of 
Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC II) project in 1975 (3:1).  This initiative was 
prompted by the Management By Objective (MBO) 9, with the stated goal of reducing 
operating and support (O&S) costs within the DoD (3:1).  MBO 9-2, a subset of MBO 9, 
pointed out that historically, DoD components did not include O&S costs as a major 
factor in the acquisition of a new weapon system (3:1).  The costs of maintaining current 
weapon systems should be identified and analyzed in order to estimate costs of new 
systems under consideration.  The purpose of MBO 9-2 was to define the total costs 
associated with the acquisition and fielding of a weapon system within the different 
branches of the armed services (3:1).  The objective divided the total Life Cycle Cost 
(LCC) of a system into two main categories: acquisition costs and ownership costs (3:2).  
The ownership costs, known collectively as O&S costs, were the area for concern and 
what most interested the DoD.  Figure 4 shows the total ownership cost composition for 
aircraft.   
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Figure 4.  Aircraft Total Ownership/Life Cycle Cost Composition (20) 
Since the establishment of MBO 9-2, “DoD policy requires the explicit consideration of 
O&S costs from the beginning of the acquisition process throughout the operational life 
of a program” (4:53).  The OSD VAMOSC program was created to fill the need for O&S 
tracking within DoD.  The Air Force responded to the initiative first with the 
development of the Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) database.  The Army 
followed with the Operating and Support Management Information System (OSMIS).  
The OSMIS is a central database that gathers information from Army weapon and 
materiel systems in order to track total O&S costs for every weapon system included in 
the Army’s inventory.   
 The Office of the Secretary of Defense/Cost Analysis Improvement Group 
(OSD/CAIG) is responsible for executive oversight of each service’s O&S database 
according to DoD regulation 5000.4-M.  The regulation requires each DoD component to 
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establish and maintain a database consisting of historical O&S data for all weapon 
systems in its inventory (4:53).  “VAMOSC data shall be used as a basis for decisions 
concerning affordability, budget development, support concepts cost tradeoffs, 
modifications, and retention of current systems” (4:53). The OSD/CAIG promotes 
standardization of data collection by DoD components and provides a means for 
exchange of ideas between the different components in order to improve the use of the 
VAMOSC data (4:55).  The CAIG also provides guidance on improving analytical 
methods for using O&S data.   
 
Major O&S Guidance 
This section explains the legal requirements of O&S estimating and reporting, as 
well as the requirements of O&S estimating provided in DoD directives and guidance.  It 
also provides the background of the current DoD and Air Force O&S reporting program.   
This section summarizes these regulations; it is not intended as a substitute.   
Title 10. 
United States Code Title 10 Section 2434 states:  
The Secretary of Defense may not approve the system development and      
demonstration, or the production and deployment, of a major defense acquisition 
program (MDAP) unless an independent estimate of the full life-cycle cost of the 
program and a manpower estimate for the program have been considered by the 
Secretary (5:Sec. 2434).    
 
The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations governing the content and 
submission of these required estimates (5:Sec. 2434).  The regulations shall require that 
the independent estimate of the full life-cycle cost of a program include all costs of 
development, procurement, military construction, and operations and support without 
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regard to funding source or management control (5:Sec. 2434).  The regulation shall also 
require that the manpower estimate include an estimate of the total number of personnel 
required to operate, maintain, and support the program upon full operational deployment; 
and to train personnel to carry out these activities (5:Sec. 2434). 
DoD 5000.4-M – O&S Costs. 
DoD Instruction 5000.2 and DoD 5000.2-M require that both a program office 
estimate (POE) and a DoD Component cost analysis (CCA) estimate be prepared 
in support of acquisition milestone reviews.  As a part of this requirement, DoD 
5000.2-M specifies that the DoD Component sponsoring an acquisition program 
establish, as a basis for cost-estimating, a description of the salient features of the 
program and of the system being acquired.  This information is present in a Cost 
Analysis Requirements Description (CARD) (4:8).   
 
The following sections of the CARD impact O&S costs:  
 
• System Reliability  
• System Maintainability  
• Hardware Support Concept  
• Software Support Concept  
• Supply 
• Training  
• System Manpower Requirements  
• Operation Support Facilities 
One of the seven cost terms standardized by DoD 5000.4-M is O&S costs.  
 
O&S costs include all personnel, equipment, supplies, software, services, 
including contract support, associated with operating, modifying, maintaining, 
supplying, training, and supporting a defense acquisition program in the DoD 
inventory.  This includes costs directly and indirectly attributable to the specific 
defense program; ie., costs that would not occur if the program did not exist 
(4:48).   
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The DoD 5000.4-M lists these O&S categories: 
 
• Mission Personnel 
• Unit Level Consumption 
• Intermediate Maintenance 
• Deport Maintenance 
• Contractor Support 
• Sustaining Support 
• Indirect Support (4:48-49)  
These O&S categories are currently (2003) in review and will be brought up to 
date with the new structure described in the Operating and Support Cost Estimating 
Guide from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Analysis Improvement 
Group (CAIG) dated July 31, 2003.   
Operating and Support Cost Estimating Guide. 
The O&S Cost Estimating Guide provides a cost structure to be established as a 
guide to assist DoD costs analysts develop and present the results of operating and 
support cost analyses (6:1).  The OSD CAIG O&S cost structure categorizes and defines 
cost elements that cover the full range of O&S cost that should occur in any defense 
system (6:1).  The O&S cost element structure is divided into six major categories: 
• Unit Personnel 
• Unit Operations 
• Maintenance 
• Sustaining Support 
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• Continuing System Improvements 
• Indirect Support (6:2) 
The Unit Personnel element includes the costs of all operator, maintenance, and 
support personnel at operating units (6:2).  Unit Personnel include active and reserve 
military, government civilian, and contractor personnel costs (6:2).  Unit Personnel Costs 
are intended to include direct costs (i.e., costs of individuals assigned at installations that 
own the system and that can be clearly associated with the system performing its intended 
defense mission (6:3)). 
Unit Operations includes the unit-level consumption of operation materials such 
as fuel, POL, electricity, expendable stores, training munitions and other operating 
materials (6:5).  Also included are any unit-funded support activities; training devices or 
simulator operations that uniquely support an operational unit; temporary additional 
duty/temporary duty (TAD/TDY) associated with the unit’s normal concept of 
operations; and other unit funded services (6:5).  Unit-funded service contracts for 
administrative equipment as well as unit-funded equipment and software leases are 
included in this portion of the estimate (6:5). 
Maintenance includes the costs of labor above the organizational level and 
materials at all levels of maintenance in support of the primary system, simulators, 
training devices, and associated support equipment (6:7).  All maintenance costs provided 
through a system support contract will be separately identified within the appropriate cost 
element (6:7). 
Sustaining support includes support services provided by centrally managed 
support activities not funded by the units that own the operating systems (6:10).  It is 
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intended that costs included in this category represent costs that can be directly tied to a 
specific system and exclude costs that must be arbitrarily allocated (6:10). 
Continuing System Improvements includes the costs of hardware and software 
updates that occur after deployment of a system that improve a system’s safety, 
reliability, maintainability, or performance characteristics to enable the system to meet its 
basic operational requirements through out its life (6:12).  These costs include 
government and contract labor, materials, and overhead costs (6:12).  Costs are required 
to be separated into government and contactor costs within each cost element (6:12). 
The Continuing System Improvements portion of an O&S estimate does not 
include all changes to a system developed subsequent to the initial delivered 
configuration (6:12).  System improvements identified as part of a pre-planned product 
improvement program that are included in the acquisition cost estimate are not included 
in this portion of an O&S cost estimate (6:12).  Improvements designed to be 
incorporated in production lots (eg., design series, block changes) and improvements that 
would qualify as distinct Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP) are not typically 
included in this portion of the O&S cost estimate (6:12-13). 
Indirect Support costs are those installation and personnel support costs that 
cannot be directly related to the units and personnel that operate and support the system 
being analyzed (6:13).  The three levels of Indirect Support include Installation Support, 
Personnel Support, and General Training and Education (6:14-15). 
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DoD 5000.4-M – Establishment of Visibility and Management of Support 
Costs and Air Force Total Ownership Costs.  
 
Chapter 4 of the DoD 5000.4-M lays the foundation for the Visibility And 
Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC) Program.  The purpose of the 
VAMOSC program is to achieve visibility of O&S costs; the DoD components are 
required to establish a historical data collection system and maintain a record of O&S 
data that facilitate the development of a well-defined, standard presentation of O&S costs 
by MDAP (4:53).   
The objectives of the VAMOSC system are to provide visibility of O&S costs for 
use in cost analysis of MDAPs and force structure alternatives in support of the Planning, 
Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) process and satisfy the Congressional 
requirement that DoD track and report O&S costs for major acquisition programs (4:53).  
VAMOSC is also to provide visibility of critical maintenance and support costs at the 
subsystem level in sufficient detail to promote cost-conscious design and configuration 
management of new and fielded defense programs (4:54).  VAMOSC is to provide 
visibility of O&S costs so they may be managed to reduce and control program life-cycle 
costs (4:54).  Finally, VAMOSC is to improve the validity and credibility of O&S cost 
estimates by establishing a widely accepted database, thereby reducing the cost and time 
for collecting these defense program O&S costs for specific application (4:54). 
The OSD/CAIG is charged with executive oversight of VAMOSC (4:55).  In this 
capacity the OSD/CAIG shall promote standardization of O&S cost data collection by the 
DoD Components, provide a forum for the exchange of ideas among the DoD 
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Components, and promote the effective use of VAMOSC data in predicting future costs 
(4:55). 
In April of 1998 the Air Force replaced its VAMOSC system with the Air Force 
Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) data system (7:19).  This new and improved system is 
also under the oversight of the CAIG and subject to the same objectives as described 
above and in DoD 5000.4-M.  The AFTOC database will be used for the analysis of the 
CPFH of the HH-60G Pave Hawk, the MH-53J/M Pave Low III/IV, and the UH-1N 
Helicopter. 
 
HH-60G Pave Hawk 
 
Figure 5.  HH-60Gs Over Naval Air Station Fallon, Nevada (21) 
There are currently 105 HH-60G Pave Hawk Helicopters in the Air Force 
inventory; its primary operational mission is Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) (8:98).  
The Pave Hawk is the most rapidly deployable, long range, combat capable rescue 
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helicopter in the Air Force inventory (8:98).  The Pave Hawk conducts day and night 
marginal weather alert response missions to recover downed aircrew or other isolated 
personnel in hostile or permissive environments (8:98).  It also performs disaster relief, 
NEO, counter-drug, civil SAR, and Space Shuttle support (8:98). 
 
MH-53J/M Pave Low III/IV  
 
Figure 6.  MH-53J Deploying Flares (21) 
There are currently 35 MH-53J/M Pave Low III/IV Helicopters in the Air Force 
inventory (8:105).  Its primary mission is low-level, long-range, undetected penetration 
into denied areas, day or night, in adverse weather, for infiltration, exfilitration, and 
resupply of special operations forces (8:105).  Missions are almost always conducted 
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under the cover of darkness, and are frequently conducted under adverse weather 
conditions requiring extended flight operations at an altitude as low as 50 feet using 
Night Vision Goggles or Instrument Meteorological Conditions as low as 100 feet above 
ground level (8:105).  Missions involve deep penetrations of hostile areas, at extreme 
ranges, without escort (8:105). 
 
UH-1N Helicopter 
 
 
Figure 7.  UH-1N over Yokota Air Base, Japan  (21) 
There are currently 63 UH-1N Helicopters in the Air Force inventory (8:119).  
This aircraft provides Special Air Mission support for the National Capital Region, and 
VIP airlift (8:119).  It also provides airlift of emergency security and disaster response 
forces (8:119).  It provides nuclear weapons security and surveillance, as well as search 
and rescue, and missile launch security (8:119). 
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Background of the Cost Per Flying Hour Program 
 The Cost per Flying Hour program is a subset of the O&S portion of a budget 
submission.  The Air Force program consists of four model-driven factors: (1) 
consumable supplies (both General Support and System Support Divisions); (2) Depot-
level reparables (DLRs); and (3) aviation fuel (AVFUEL) (9:4).  
(1) Consumable supplies include aircraft parts and supplies that are not repaired and are 
discarded after use (9:4-5).   
(2) Depot-level reparables are aircraft parts that are removed by maintenance personnel 
and sent to a depot for repairs (9:5).   
(3) AVFUEL is fuel used during flight (9:5).   
 The cost associated with the Air Force flying hour program is calculated by using 
a metric known as Cost Per Flying Hour (CPFH) (9:4).  “Flying hours are the basic 
element for measuring aircraft usage to train aircrews for wartime taskings” (9:4).   
Each year in the November/December timeframe, the major commands (MAJCOMs) 
must submit recommended CPFH rates for each weapon system that will be included in 
the Cost per Flying Hour Program (9:6).  A separate factor for consumables, DLRs, and 
AVFUEL will be included in the submission (9:6).   
 The CPFH development begins by creating a baseline rate using the most recent 
year-end totals for obligations and flying hours (9:6).  “Year-end obligations corrected 
for one-time obligations divided by hours flown develop the baseline CPFH” (9:6).   
The next step involves adjusting the four approved factors due to economic conditions, 
such as inflation/deflation (9:6).  Major commands also review the factors and adjust 
them to account for anything that will affect the cost per flying hour, such as forecasted 
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changes in policy, special programs starting, or changes in the level of maintenance 
(10:8-9).   
 At the same time, the Air Force Working Capital Fund (AFWCF) updates the 
budget and rates for all the AFWCF products, which includes DLRs and consumables, a 
major part of the CPFH expense (9:7).  The four CPFH factors are adjusted according to 
price changes forecast by managers of the AFWCF (10:10).   
 Finally, the factors are used to fund flying hour programs in Air Force’s Program 
Objective Memorandum (POM), the Budget Estimate Submission (BES), and the 
President’s Budget (PB), as well as the Financial Plan’s initial distribution to the 
MAJCOMs (9:7). 
 “The Air Force Working Capital Fund was created in 1996 by the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) as a reorganization of the Defense Business 
Operations Fund” (10:10).  The AFWCF is a revolving fund that sells items necessary to 
support troops, weapon systems, aircraft, communications systems, and other military 
equipment (10:10).  DoD Financial Management Regulation 7000.14R requires that the 
prices established by the AFWCF at the beginning remain stable for the remainder of the 
fiscal year (10:10).  This stability allows analysts to use the cost factors previously 
calculated to budget more accurately for the flying hour program.  For fiscal years 1996 
and 1997, the AFWCF was unable to establish accurate price lists for the repairable parts 
and consumable items that it supplied to Air Force flying units.  After budgets were 
submitted and approved, prices for repairable parts and consumables were raised to the 
point that the MAJCOMs feared they would not have enough money to complete their 
flying hour programs (10:12).  This price increase forced the Air Force to request 
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supplemental funding to correct the projected shortfall (10:12).  The AFWCF price 
instability has been known for some time and efforts to correct it are currently in progress 
(10:14). 
 
Past Research 
 
 Trends in Weapon System Operating and Support Costs. 
This 1997 study focuses on the weapons systems and mission areas that are 
responsible for force structure-related O&S cost increases.  Two portions of this study 
that are of particular interest to this research are the Department and Mission Category 
Analyses, and the Weapons System Case Studies.  The Department and Mission Category 
Analyses compares O&S costs for FY 1975, 1985, and 1995 for the DoD as a whole, the 
services, and for selected major mission categories, and analyze the results with respect 
to changes in equipment levels, activity rates, capability, age, and asset value (12:I-3).  
The Weapons System Case Studies compare O&S costs for the same years at system-
class level in selected mission categories as case studies (12:I-3).  The Future Years 
Defense Program (FYDP) database was used as the primary source of O&S cost data for 
the Department and Mission Category Analyses; and for the Weapons System Case 
Studies the O&S cost data was drawn from each services VAMOSC database (12:I-4,7). 
 This study first looks at the O&S growth for the department and services during 
the FY 1975 to FY 1995 period.  When the data is normalized to FY 1975, the O&S cost 
of the DoD grew four percent, Navy grew two percent, Army declined six percent, and 
the Air Force declined thirteen percent (12:I-8).  These figures are a combination of 
substantial reductions in military personnel costs and substantial increases in O&M costs 
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(12:I-8).  For the same period, DoD O&M costs grew by 36 percent, the Army by 31 
percent, the Navy by 23 percent, and the Air Force by 11 percent (12:I-8).   
After a brief methodology explaining the charts to be used, the study focuses its 
attention on the different services starting with the Department of the Army.  The review 
of this study will focus on the Department of the Army since the analysis of the Army 
included helicopters and the areas covering the Navy and the Air Force excluded 
helicopters from the analysis of O&S costs. 
The Army experienced a six percent decrease in O&S costs between FY 1975 and 
FY 1995; at the same time, O&M costs rose by twenty-four percent (12:II-1).  In the 
Mission Category review of the Army the study included Attack Helicopters, Observation 
Helicopters, and Utility Helicopters. 
 Attack Helicopters. 
 For Attack Helicopters Table 2 and Figure 8 show that between FY 1975 and FY 
1995: 
• The total number of aircraft increased 82 percent while flying hours increased by 
78 percent, 
 
• There was a 157 percent increase in total O&M, 
 
• Asset value increased by 285 percent and mission capability increased by 339 
percent (12:II-8). 
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Table 2.  Attack Helicopter Data 
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Figure 8.  Attack Helicopters 
The per unit section of Table 2 and Figure 9 show that between FY 1975 and FY 1995 
O&M cost: 
• Per aircraft increased by 41 percent, 
FY75 FY85 FY95
766 1,140 1,393
205 326 527
133,046 201,898 236,370
2,920 4,599 11,248
1,538 2,655 6,754
5 11.5 13.5
174 177 170
268 286 378
1,544 1,613 2,228
703 708 468
134 123 78
AH-1E 97 23
AH-1F 352 501 490
AH-1G 31 11 3
AH-1P 2 95 10
AH-1S 381 389 121
AH-64A 47 746
Equipment Data
Hours
Asset Value ($M)
O&M Per Flight Hour ($)
O&M Per $10K Asset Value ($)
O&M Per Capabiity Unit ($K)
Average Age
Flying Hours Per Aircraft
O&M Per Aircraft ($K)
Data Element
Aircraft
O&M ($M)
TASCFORM
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• Per flying hour increased by 44 percent, 
 
• Per $100K of Asset Value dropped by 33 percent, and 
 
• Per unit of capability dropped by 41 percent (12:II-8). 
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Figure 9.  Attack Helicopter O&S Cost Ratio Changes 
During the FY 1975 to FY 1995 period there was a marked increased modernization 
of attack helicopters (12:II-10).  Table 3 focuses on attack helicopter inventories for the 
time period of this study.  The Army phased out over 300 older AH-1s during the period 
and introduced over 700 new AH-64s (12:II-10).  This modernization has had a 
substantial effect on operating costs, Table 3 also shows the annual operating cost 
figures for attack helicopters and indicates that the AH-64s are nearly twice as expensive 
as the AH-1s (12:II-10).   
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Table 3.  Attack Helicopter Modernization & Annual O&M Costs 
 
The Army’s experience in this mission area is typical of one in which substantial 
modernization has taken place during the 20-year period: 
• O&M cost per flight hour is up, 
 
• O&M cost per unit of asset value is down, 
 
• O&M cost per unit of capability is down, and 
 
• O&M cost per aircraft has been managed down somewhat by reducing flying 
hours (12:II-11). 
 
The flying hour reduction per aircraft is small: 
 
• In FY 1975, 133,046 flying hours were allocated among 766 aircraft to produce 
an average of 174 flying hours per aircraft per year (12:II-11). 
 
• In FY 1995, 236,370 flying hours were allocated among 1393 aircraft to produce 
an average of 170 flying hours per aircraft, a decrease of approximately 2 percent 
(12:II-11). 
 
Altogether, changes in the number and mix of aircraft between FY 1975 and FY 
1995 and the differences in their operating costs substantially account for the $322 
million increase in O&M cost in Table 2 (12:II-11). 
Aircraft Type FY75 FY95 Change
AH-1S 381.00 121.00 -260.00
AH-1G 31.00 3.00 -28.00
AH-1E 23 23.00
AH-1P 2.00 10.00 8.00
AH-1F 352.00 490.00 138.00
AH-64A 746 746.00
O&M ($M)
0.31
0.57
Aircraft Type
AH-1S
AH-64
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 Observation Helicopters. 
 For Observation Helicopters Table 4 and Figure 10 show that between FY 1975 
and FY 1995: 
• The total number of aircraft decreased 35 percent,  
 
• There is a 30-percent decrease in total O&M, and  
 
• Asset value decreased by 27 percent (12:II-11). 
 
Table 4.  Observation Helicopter Data 
 
FY75 FY85 FY95
2,470 2,324 1,606
120 113 83
481,650 453,180 313,170
313 297 228
4 14 19.3
195 195 195
49 49 51
250 250 264
3,842 3,816 3,629
OH-58A 1,479 1,368 782
OH-58C 594 582 443
OH-58D 5 7 327
OH-6A 392 367 54
Equipment Data
Data Element
Aircraft
O&M ($M)
Hours
Asset Value ($M)
Not Available
O&M Per Aircraft ($K)
O&M Per Flight Hour ($)
O&M Per $10K Asset Value ($)
TASCFORM
Average Age
Flying Hours Per Aircraft
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Figure 10.  Observation Helicopters Total Resource and Performance Changes 
The per unit section of Table 4 and Figure 11 show that between FY 1975 and FY 1995, 
the O&M cost: 
• Per aircraft increased by 4 percent, 
 
• Per flying hour increased by 6 percent, and  
 
• Per $100K of Asset Value dropped by 6 percent (12:II-12) 
Figure 11.  Observation Helicopter O&S Cost Ratio Changes 
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 The Army bought new models of observation helicopters and reduced the size of 
its fleet during this period (12:II-13).  Table 5 focused on observation helicopter 
inventories for the time period of this study.  The Army phased out 338 older OH-6A and 
848 OH-58A-C models during the period and introduced 322 new OH-58Ds.  (12:II-13).  
This modernization has increased operating costs for observation helicopters, Table 5 
also shows the annual operation cost figures for observation helicopters and indicates that 
the OH-58s are nearly twice as expensive as the OH-6s. 
Table 5.  Observation Helicopter Modernization & Annual O&M Costs 
 
 The Army’s experience in this mission area is one in which some modernization 
has taken place during the 20 year period (12:II-14).  Also, a significant drawdown in the 
number of aircraft changed the model mix enough so that: 
• O&M cost per flight hour is up, and  
 
• O&M cost per unit of asset value is down (12:II-14). 
 
The change in the number and mix of aircraft between FY 1975 and FY 1995 
substantially accounts for the $37 Million decrease in O&M costs shown for observation 
helicopters in Table 4 (12:II-14). 
 
O&M ($K)
34.0
67.0
Aircraft Type
OH-6
AH-64
Aircraft Type FY75 FY95 Change
OH-6A 392.00 54.00 -338.00
OH-58A 1479.00 782.00 -697.00
OH-58C 594 443 -151.00
OH-58D 5.00 327.00 322.00
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Utility Helicopters. 
 For Utility Helicopters Table 6 and Figure 12 reveal several important changes 
between FY 1975 and FY 1995: 
• The total number of aircraft decreased 25 percent, 
 
• There is a 56 percent increase in total O & M, and  
 
• Asset Value increased by 23 percent. (12:II-14). 
 
Table 6.  Utility Helicopter Data 
 
FY75 FY85 FY95
4,430 4,427 3,335
331 476 517
952,450 951,131 715,783
3,598 7,716 9,558
945,362 1,191,810 1,167,006
6.6 13.8 18.6
215 215 215
75 108 155
348 500 722
920 617 540
350 399 443
UH-1B 430 55 38
UH-1H 3,322 3,066 1,688
UH-1M 309 246
UH-1V 369 386 367
UH-60A 674 926
UH-60L 316
Equipment Data
O&S Per Aircraft ($K)
O&S Per Flight Hour ($)
O&S Per $10K Asset Value ($)
O&S Per Capabiity Unit ($)
Asset Value ($M)
Ton-miles per hour
Average Age
Flying Hours Per Aircraft
Data Element
Aircraft
O&M ($M)
Hours
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Figure 12.  Utility Helicopter Total Resource and Performance Changes 
Looking at the per unit section of Table 6 and Figure 13 we see that between FY 1975 
and FY 1995 the O&M cost: 
• Per flying hour increased by 207 percent, 
• Per $100k of Asset Value dropped by 166 percent, and 
• Per unit of capability increased by 27 percent (12:II-14). 
Figure 13.  Utility Helicopter O&S Cost Ratio Changes 
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The Army modernized its utility helicopters during this period and reduced the size of 
its fleet (12:II-16).  Table 7 focuses on Utility Helicopter inventories for the time period 
of this study.  Lover 2,300 older UH-1 models were phased out during the period and 
over 1,200 new UH-60s were introduced (12:II-16).  Table 7 also shows that this 
modernization has caused mission operating costs to increase, and also indicates that the 
UH-1s are much cheaper to operate than the UH-60s (12:II-16). 
Table 7.  Utility Helicopter Modernization & Annual O&M Costs 
 
 The change in the mix of aircraft between FY 1975 and FY 1995 substantially 
accounts for the $186 million increase in O&M costs shown for Utility Helicopters in 
Table 6 (12:II-16).  The Army’s experience in this mission area is typical of one in which 
moderate modernization has taken place during the 20 year period: 
• O&M cost per flight hour is up, and 
 
• O&M cost per unit of Asset Value is down (12:II-17). 
 
However, in the case of utility helicopters, O&M cost per unit of capability is up (12:II-
17). 
O&M ($K)
54.0
194.0
305.0
Aircraft Type
UH-1H
UH-60A
UH-60L
Aircraft Type FY75 FY95 Change
UH-1B 430 38 -392
UH-1H 3,322 1,688 -1,634
UH-1M 309 -309
UH-1V 369 367 -2
UH-60A 926 926
UH-60L 316 316
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 The study shifts its attention to case studies comparing O&S costs and 
characteristics of similar weapon systems.  Two studies that are of particular interest are 
Attack Helicopters: AH-1s vs. AH-64A and Utility Helicopters: UH-1H vs. UH-60A. 
 Attack Helicopters: AH-1s vs. AH-64A. 
 Comparative O&S cost and helicopter characteristic data are summarized in Table 
8 for the Cobra (AH-1) and the Apache (AH-64A) attack helicopters (12:II-19). 
Table 8.  O&S Costs and Characteristics for Attack Helicopters 
 
 
AH-1S AH-64A
8,648 10,220
38,532 7,497
11,262 60,494
150,352 326,922
28,253 22,782
14,756 1,769
251,803 429,685
130 130
1937 3305
1 1.71
10,000 14,694
6,598 11,387
133 158
369 300
2.6 1.83
262 370
2 2
3.7 12.81
3.182 10.47
AWG-10 AWG-9
20-mm cannon 30-mm chain gun
8 TOW missiles Hellfire missiles
76 2.75-in. rockets Hydra 70 rockets
Capability (TASCFORM score)
Weapon Control
Armament
Fuel Capacity (gallons)
Crew
Asset Value ($M)
Ammunition
Cost Ratio
Max TOGW (lbs.)
Empty Weight (lbs.)
Depot Maintenance (End Item)
Intermediate Maintenance
Repairables (Net)
Consumables
Characteristics
Flight Hours Per Year
Direct O&S Cost Per Flight Hour
Fuel
Cost Element
Annual Direct O&S Cost
Max Speed (knots)
Operating radius (miles)
Endurance (hours)
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Total O&S costs for the AH-64A are 71 percent higher than comparable costs for the 
AH-1S (12:II-20).  Consumables and component repair (repairables) showed much larger 
than average increases while ammunition, intermediate maintenance, and depot end-item 
maintenance were less (12:II-20). 
 The AH-64A is larger, heavier, and faster than the AH-1S and has a more 
sophisticated armament and fire-control system (12:II-20).  The asset value of the  
AH-64A is 246 percent higher than for the AH-1, and the TASCFORM score, a measure 
of weapon system capability, is 229 percent higher for the AH-64A (12:II-20).  The  
AH-64’s asset value and capability grew faster than its O&S cost, which results in a 
lower O&S cost per unit of asset value or capability than for the AH-1S. 
Utility Helicopters: UH-1H vs. UH-60A. 
 Comparative O&S cost and helicopter characteristic data are summarized in Table 
9 for the for the Huey (UH-1H) and Blackhawk (UH-60A) utility helicopters (12:II-20). 
The UH-60A is more than twice the empty weight of the UH-1H, and it has the capability 
to carry twice as much cargo (externally loaded) (12:II-20).  The maximum speed is 145 
knots compared to 107 for the UH-1H.  The asset value of the UH-60A is 615 percent 
higher than for the UH-1H (12:II-20).  The UH-60A is 172 percent higher in terms of 
ton-miles per hour, a measure of capability used for cargo carrying non-combat vehicles 
(12:II-20). 
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Table 9.  O&S Costs and Characteristics for Utility Helicopters 
 
 O&S costs for the UH-60A are 177 percent higher, asset value is 615 percent 
higher, and capability is 172 percent higher than for the UH-1H.  The UH-60’s capability  
grew at about the same rate as its O&S cost, which resulted in a similar O&S cost per 
unit of capability compared to the UH-1H (12:II-21).  The UH-60’s asset value grew 
faster than its O&S cost, which results in a lower O&S cost per unit of asset value (12:II-
21). 
UH-1H UH-60A
9,104 10,220
259 7,497
4,843 60,494
43,782 326,922
32,599 22,782
8,674 1,769
99,261 429,685
150 130
662 3305
1 2.77
9,500 14,694
5,210 11,387
106.7 158
317 300
209 370
4,000 lbs external 8,000 lbs external
or 10 passengers 11 combat troops
3 3
0.923 6.6
213.4 580
3 x 7.62-mm MGs 2 x 7.62-mm MGs
Payload
Crew
Capability (Ton-miles per hour)
Armament
Cost Element
Fuel
Ammunition
Consumables
Repairables (Net)
Intermediate Maintenance
Depot Maintenance (End Item)
Annual Direct O&S Cost
Flight Hours Per Year
O&S Cost Per Flight Hour
Cost Ratio
Characteristics
Max TOGW (lbs.)
Empty Weight (lbs.)
Max Speed (knots)
Combat radius (miles)
Fuel Capacity (gallons)
Asset Value ($M)
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 Both the Department of the Navy and the Department of the Air Force sections of 
this study looked at the Air to Ground Mission Categories for each service.  However, 
neither of these sections or mission categories addressed O&S costs of Navy or Air Force 
helicopters.  This further validates the need for research in these areas and lends credit to 
the methodology of this research which looks to compare like weapon systems across 
services. 
Parametric Cost Modeling for Navy Aircraft. 
 Parametric models have been developed for numerous weapon systems to provide 
cost analysts with tools useful for predicting costs for analogous systems.  In his thesis 
entitled, A Parametric Cost Model for Estimating Operating and Support Costs of U.S. 
Navy Aircraft, Mustafa Donmez develops multiple parametric models to determine yearly 
O&S costs for new naval aircraft acquisition programs.  Physical parameters such as 
thrust and weight are used to establish any relationships between the dependent and 
independent variables.  The VAMOSC system is used to extract all historical aircraft 
information.  Cost information is analyzed from 1987 through 1998 and is reported in 
constant FY00 dollars. 
 Donmez focused on two main objectives throughout his research.  The goals were 
to find the best fitting O&S model and to create a robust aircraft O&S cost estimating 
methodology for Navy cost analysts when limited information is available to complete 
the estimate (13:5).  Three different parametric cost models were built in the analysis.  
Donmez used multivariate linear regression, a tree-based model, and single variable 
regression to construct the models (13:10).  The weighted ordinary least squares method 
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was used on the first two models because VAMOSC does not break out costs for 
individual aircraft and each command possesses different numbers of aircraft.    
 The cost data supplied by the Naval Center for Cost Analysis (NCCA) is broken 
out by different classes of aircraft.  The four categories are as follows: Fighter/Attack 
(FA), Cargo/Utility (C/U), Rotary-Wings (HELO), and Other (OTH) (13:14).  Multiple 
Type/Mission/Series aircraft were removed from the analysis due to small sample size.  
Natural Logarithms were use to transform the data for the purpose of normalization.  
After eliminating specific T/M/S from analysis and transforming the data, two 
assumptions were validated: 
• The weighted average annual cost for any aircraft T/M/S is constant; it does not 
systematically increase or decrease annually (13:18). 
 
• Annual O&S cost observations are random samples and drawn from a 
hypothetical population of aircraft (13:18). 
 
 In the multivariate model, the following independent variables were used to 
examine significant effects on O&S costs (13:34): 
• Commands- Atlantic Fleet (LANFLT), Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), NET (Naval 
Education and Training), Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), Naval Forces 
Europe (NAVEUR), Reserve Commands (RESERVE), and MISC 
(Miscellaneous) 
 
• Weight- Continuous Variable (in lbs) 
• Length- Continuous Variable (in ft) 
• Wing Span- Continuous Variable (in ft) 
• Height- Continuous Variable (in ft) 
• Thrust- Continuous Variable (in st lb) 
• Type- Categorical Variable (A/F, C/U, OTH, HELO) 
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• Speed- Continuous Variable (in mph) 
• Crew- Categorical Variable (Number of Manpower on Board 
• Engines- Categorical Variable (Number of Engines) 
 The results of the multivariate model show that wingspan and height have an 
effect on O&S cost growth and weight, engine number, and thrust do not affect O&S 
costs when other independent variables are present (13:40).  Stepwise regression was 
used to determine the utility of the model.  The multivariate model exhibits the best 
summary statistics out of the three models but it is the least useful model.  There are too 
many independent variables in the equation to have any practical use for accurate 
prediction. 
 The second model constructed, the tree-based model, provides the best model for 
estimating O&S costs.  The results prove more reliable than the other regression-type 
models.  Tree models successively split data into homogeneous subsets (13:46).  Tree-
based models can be described as “a recursive procedure resulting in terminal nodes or 
“leaves” containing groups of cases with similar values in their independent variables, 
which reflect response probabilities” (13:46). 
 The tree-based model for this particular research splits the data into two subsets: 
Reserve and Non-Reserve data.  Each T/M/S was further broken into the four aircraft 
categories mentioned previously.  Weight, length, and thrust were used as predictor 
variables because of their alleged relationship with O&S cost.  The original model 
resulted in a tree with 51 nodes and a standard error of 1.536 (13:48).  The model was 
reduced to a 10-node tree with an increased standard error of only 0.115.  The 10-node 
tree is more easily interpreted than the 51-node tree.    
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 The last model analyzed used univariate regression as a predictor of O&S costs.  
Again, the same predictor parameters of weight, length, and thrust were used because of 
the perceived relationship with O&S costs.  All of the predictive measures exhibit poor 
summary statistics when analyzed in a statistical software package.  The parameter 
variables do show some predictive capabilities confirmed by the low F-statistic values 
(13:58-68). 
 The final conclusions of Donmez’s research indicates more research needs to be 
completed to find better predictive models for estimating O&S costs.  The univariate and 
multivariate models show that “O&S costs of future aircraft acquisitions are not well-
modeled by the physical and performance parameters identified in this study” (13:69).  
The performance parameters do affect O&S costs but they are not successful in 
explaining costs.  The regression models analyzed provide rough-order-of-magnitude 
(ROM) estimates for analysts that do not possess the time nor experience to complete a 
comprehensive analysis for future O&S costs for a weapon system.  The tree-based 
model provided the most successful model in terms of overall use coupled with predictive 
capability. 
Parametric Cost Modeling for Air Force Aircraft. 
 While studying at the Naval Post Graduate School, Wu Ming-Cheng completed a 
thesis that explored O&S parametric modeling for all Air Force aircraft from 1990 
through 1998.  Ming-Cheng developed his research from a prior RAND study that 
developed cost-estimating relationships (CERs) for Air Force aircraft from 1981 through 
1986.  Ming-Cheng reported that flyaway costs and flying hours were the major cost 
 44
drivers during that period (14:2).  Additionally, the Ming-Cheng thesis reported modest 
cost growth as the aircraft fleet aged. 
 Ming-Cheng tried to determine if the cost drivers for O&S costs observed during 
the years of the RAND study still applied to Air Force aircraft in recent years past.  The 
ability to retrieve O&S aircraft cost data is easier now that the AFTOC system is fully 
operational.  Ming-Cheng cited three subsystems broken down in the AFTOC system: 
Weapon System Support Cost (WSSC), Component Cost System (CSCS), and Source 
Data Preprocessor (SDP) (14:5-6).  Ming-Cheng’s thesis specifically focused on the 
WSSC subsystem of the AFTOC.   
 Ming-Cheng developed three models using regression analysis to obtain the best 
equation for successfully predicting O&S costs for aircraft models.  Flying hours, 
flyaway costs, number of aircraft, and aircraft fleet ages were the independent variables 
in the analysis (14:37-40).  Additionally, Ming-Cheng added dummy variables for type of 
aircraft.  Aircraft types were broken down into three categories: fighter/attack, 
cargo/tanker, and other.  The results of the regression analysis provides a similar 
conclusion to the previously mentioned RAND study that examined O&S cost drivers for 
Air Force aircraft.  Average flying hours, number of aircraft, flyaway costs, and fleet age 
were all significant in predicting whether or not a certain type of aircraft will experience 
O&S cost growth.  The flyaway cost variable is noted as possibly the most significant 
explanatory variable in predicting O&S cost growth (14:49). 
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O&S Cost Reduction – U.S. Navy.                         
  O&S reduction initiatives have been at the forefront for all service branches.  
Significant cost savings were identified for the Navy in its replacement timing of its H-3 
helicopter fleet with the CH-60.  The Sikorsky H-3 helicopter has been in service for an 
average of 34 years (15:2).  The Navy has 54 in its inventory and has projected the first 
replacement CH-60 to occur in the year 2008 (15:2-3).  Even though the H-3 fleet 
recently underwent an overhaul process, maintaining these old aircraft will become 
increasingly expensive (15:2).   
 The H-3 performs the following missions for the Navy:  
• Executive battle staff transportation- the movement of VIPs from ship to ship, 
ship to shore, shore to ship, or shore to shore. 
 
• Search and rescue  
• Passenger/Mail/Cargo Services and Air 
• Torpedo/Drone recovery 
• Special warfare support  
The CH-60 will be able to meet all the above mission requirements along with 
additional capability.  The addition of external fuel tanks will allow an endurance 
increase up to six hours (15:10).  Air speed with the CH-60 will be faster, between 150 
and 175 knots compared to 120 knots of the H-3.  It will also have a more modern 
computerized hovering system, allowing it more stability when hovering (15:11).  The 
CH-60 will also be able to carry up to 5,500 pounds of palletized cargo, as well as a 
9,000 pound cargo hook compared to a 6,000 pound hook for the H-3 (15:13-15).  
Finally, the CH-60 will have self protection available, making it equipped to perform 
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many of its duties in more hostile environments if necessary (15:16).  “It will have 
ballistically tolerant fuel systems, flight controls and dynamic components.  It will have 
infrared suppression, wire strike protection, and chaff and flare dispensers (15:15-16).” 
In order to compare the benefits of replacing the H-3 with the CH-60, a 
comparison of historical costs was performed.  From 1986 to 1996, the Navy operated 
seven models of the H-3 helicopter (15:21).  One of the models, the SH-3H, was used for 
anti-submarine warfare and not combat support mission, so data for this version was not 
included in the calculation of O&S costs for the H-3 (15:21).  The data for the total yearly 
O&S cost for the six models came from the Navy’s VAMOSC system.  The total annual 
O&S cost for the H-3 was found by adding the costs for each of the 10 years.  The total 
O&S costs were approximately $1.1 billion (1997 constant dollars) (15:21-22).  The total 
flying hours for each model by year was also available in the VAMOSC database, which 
totaled across the ten year period to 200,580 hours (15:27).  The average O&S cost per 
flight hour was found by dividing the total annual cost by the total flying hours, which 
was $5,324 (1997 constant dollars) (15:28). 
Now that an average cost per flight hour had been determined for the H-3, similar 
calculations had to be performed for the CH-60.  At the time of the comparison, the  
CH-60 had not entered into Navy service, so historical O&S cost data was unavailable 
(15:29).  The Navy VAMOSC system had data available on the HH-60 helicopter, which 
was the closest aircraft in mission and configuration to the CH-60 (15:29).  The HH-60H 
Sea Hawk was determined to be the best surrogate for CH-60 O&S costs (15:31).  Data 
was available for the Sea Hawk from 1990 to 1996 (15:32).  The estimated cost per flight 
hour for the HH-60H was $3,347 (15:38).   
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The estimated savings in O&S costs per year were found by multiplying an 
average utilization rate of 342 hours per helicopter by the number of H-3s in the Navy’s 
inventory by each of the determined cost per flying hour figures previously calculated 
(15:40-41).  The total savings achieved by replacing the H-3 now as opposed to much 
later was $36.5 million annually (15:45). 
The current plan involved replacing the H-3 starting in 2008 by procuring 6 the 
first year, followed by 18 each year until 42 CH-60s were available to replace 54 H-3s 
(15:42).  The proposed plan involved accelerating the procurement by eight years and 
increasing the first purchases up to 36 aircraft (15:44).  The total O&S savings for the 
period from 2000 to 2010 were found to be $292.1 million (15:45).      
Since the planned replacement of the H-3 with the CH-60 was not a one-to-one 
replacement, base operating and support costs would also be much lower (15:46).  These 
costs are incurred by the facility that supports the squadron that operates the aircraft and 
include such things as lodging, personnel support, and general support (15:46).  Finally, 
“increasing the number of helicopters purchased per year would allow the manufacturer 
to take advantage of economies of scale and spread the fixed costs of the production of 
the aircraft over more units (15:47).”  The procurement cost per unit would be lower, 
compensating the cost of replacing the helicopters sooner (15:47). 
Assessing Competitive Strategies for the Joint Strike Fighter. 
The management team of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) saw the importance of 
reduced O&S costs in the early concept and development stages of the program. The 
management team wanted to analyze the benefits to be realized in O&S cost savings by 
introducing contractor competition during the Engineering and Manufacturing 
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Development (EMD) and production phases.  The idea is that such competition will lead 
to better design and production, which would also lead to better reliability during field 
operations.  A frequently referenced example is the great engine war, which pitted 
General Electric’s F-110 engine against Pratt & Whitney’s F-100 engine to induce Pratt 
& Whitney to produce a more reliable version of the F-100 engine (16:65).  DoD relied 
on the fact that this higher reliability will lead to a reduction in O&S costs.  The JSF 
management team decided to examine the extent of possible competition-induced 
reductions in O&S costs to see if such reductions might be large enough to affect their 
estimate of the likelihood of breaking even by introducing a second-source producer 
(16:65). 
The analysis of this O&S costs reduction effort followed a four-step approach: 
1. Elements of O&S costs were identified that were likely to be affected by the 
contractor’s actions during EMD and production in a typical military aircraft 
program.  This was done by reviewing the categories by which O&S costs are 
typically reported and judging which of those would be likely to change as a 
result of changes in system reliability.  
 
2. The magnitudes of those competition-sensitive O&S costs in the JSF were 
determined, as currently estimated its projected operational life.  The JSF 
Program Office provided this data. 
 
3. The sensitivity of those competition-sensitive O&S costs to changes in reliability 
were calculated.  Those estimates, made by the Naval Air Systems Command 
(NAVAIR) using the JSF O&S cost estimation model, yielded a range of possible 
savings resulting from competition during production, expressed as a percentage 
change in certain JSF O&S costs. 
 
4. The Savings were used to adjust previously reported break-even calculations to 
determine whether the projected O&S cost savings led to a significant change in 
the overall likelihood of breaking even (16:65-66). 
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In step 1, it was concluded that contractors have the highest level of potential 
influence over O&S costs in five areas: unit-level consumable supplies, depot-level 
repairables, airframe overhauls, engine overhauls, and support equipment repair (16:66).  
In step 2 engine overhauls was excluded because competition for engine EMD and 
production is already planned.  Percentages of O&S costs were determined for 
consumables, Depot-level repairable, and overhauls.  It was determined in steps 3 and 4 
that competition-induced improvements in system reliability are likely to yield O&S 
dollar savings over the operational life of the JSF fleet, however, the reductions that 
would be realized would not be large enough to overcome the cost penalties of 
introducing competition (16:72). 
Air Force Flying Hour Program – Historical Problems. 
The Air Force has had problems accurately forecasting flying hour program 
estimates, mainly due to the confusion over how to define flying hour consumable 
supplies.  “Up until FY92, when wing financial analysts used the term ‘flying hour 
program’, they were referring to consumable supplies used to maintain their wing’s 
aircraft (17:1).”  The term ‘flying hour program’ was redefined and included many more 
elements when funding for Depot Level Reparables (DLRs) and Aviation Petroleum, Oil, 
and Lubricants (AVPOL) was decentralized to the wing level (17:1).   
For years, the financial community had worked diligently on the task of clearly 
defining and properly measuring the flying hour consumable supplies program (17:1).  
With the decentralization of DLRs and AVPOL, the work was left unfinished and a more 
clear-cut definition was not made available (17:1). 
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Since 1980, financial analysts had significant problems with the planning, 
programming, and budgeting for flying hour consumable supplies (17:2).  Since there 
was no Air Force-wide definition of consumables, each major command (MAJCOM) 
distributed funding, tracked expenditures, and performed analysis based on its own 
definition (17:2).  Another issue that arose involved the different philosophies among the 
MAJCOMs (17:2).  “While one command might consider flying hour related costs to 
include any costs directly or indirectly related to maintaining the aircraft, another might 
use a stricter definition and only include costs directly related to maintaining the aircraft 
(17:2).”   
With funding decentralization and growth of the flying hour program, wing and 
MAJCOM levels had a more critical task of justifying funding requirements and also 
spending reduction with funding already in place (17:2-3).  The different consumable 
supply definitions used by the MAJCOMs and inconsistencies between, as well as within 
commands, on what is considered a flying hour expense made this task difficult for the 
wing and MAJCOMs (17:3).   
At the time, consumable supplies shared the same accounting codes with non-
flying mission items.  A financial analyst had to manually separate the flying mission 
items from non-flying items, a very time-consuming task prone to error (17:8).  If 
consumables had their own unique accounting code, retrieving the needed information 
specifically for flying-mission items would be much simpler and allow the analyst to 
construct a true picture of flying hour expenditures (17:8).  Due to cost reduction efforts 
DoD wide, more accurate information is critical for leaders to make informed decisions 
(17:8).   
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A formal definition of what qualifies as flying hour consumables must be 
developed and distributed (17:9).  “This definition should not be based on where an item 
is purchased, but what an item is and how it relates to the flying mission (17:9).”  The 
definition should include a formalized list of criteria, with examples to aid personnel in 
determining whether an item should be classified as flying hour-related (17:9).    
Cost Per Flying Hour Calculation. 
 In a thesis entitled Flight Hour Costing at the Type Commander and Navy Staff 
Levels: An Analytical Assessment, Edwards examines the Flying Hour Program (FHP) 
and assesses the models used at the operational level, the community sponsor level, and 
the budgeting level (18:6).  The Navy FHP “is the primary vehicle through which the 
Service maintains a readily available force of combat and support aircraft, aircrews, and 
ground support personnel” (18:7).  Edwards concentrates his research on the Pacific Fleet 
(COMNAVAIRPAC).  One goal of the thesis was to “provide guidelines for budget 
control to more accurately predict variances as well as the average flight hour costs by 
aircraft type” (18:3-4).  Edwards claims that FHP estimates are not correct during budget 
formulation because FHP funds are capped by Congress (18:2).  The calculation for FHP 
funding is calculated by multiplying required flight hours to sustain a planned proficiency 
by the CPFH of each specific T/M/S of aircraft (18:1-2).  The thesis explores alternate 
methods of predicting FHP costs in the search for a better way of estimating future costs. 
 Edwards asserts that inaccurate estimates for the FHP adversely affect mission 
readiness.  This research provides Type Commanders and Naval Air Station comptrollers 
with the current factors that affect FHP calculations so that true FHP predictions reflect 
all of the crucial factors involved in forecasting FHP projections.  Edwards describes the 
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procedures involved in the budget submission process for the FHP.  The calculation for 
the annual budgeted cost for active duty units is as follows: 
• (Primary Authorized Aircraft per sqdn) x (Crew Seat Ratio) = Allowed Crews per 
Squadron (18:17). 
 
• (Allowed Crews) x (Aircrew Manning Factors) = Budgeted Crews per Squadron 
(18:18). 
 
• (Budgeted Crews) x (Req. Hrs/Crew/Month) x (12 mos.) = Annual Flying Hours 
Required per Sqdn (18:18). 
 
• (Ann. Flying Hrs Req. per Sqdn) x (Number of Sqdns) = Total Annual Flying 
Hours Required (18:18). 
 
• (Total Ann. Flying Hrs Req.) x (Primary Mission Readiness percentage) = Annual 
Budgeted Flying Hours (18:18). 
 
• (Ann. Budgeted Flying Hours) x (CPFH) = Annual Budgeted Cost, Active Duty 
forces (converted to “then-year” dollars) (18:18). 
 
 Each individual unit submits requirements through the chain of command during 
the budget cycle.  The units are compiled and later combined with the other services 
inputs.  Reviews are conducted until OSD and the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) agree on the funding items.  Eventually, the submission for the FHP becomes part 
of the Federal Budget submission to Congress.  
 Edwards describes the relationship between the players involved in submitting the 
flight hour costing information as well as the CPFH determination.  The office of the 
Special Assistant for the Flying Hour Program (N889E) collects flight information 
compiled into a database dating back to 1982.  The Type Commanders submit data in 
Flight Hour Cost Reports (FHCR) that separate the information into actual obligations 
taken from each T/M/S by total number and cost pool (18:42).  The database is updated 
monthly.  To make budgeted CPFH projections, the Navy Comptroller’s Office calculates 
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a three-year running average of the actuals presented by the Type Commanders on their 
FHCR’s (18:42).  After a three-year average is determined, the appropriate escalator 
factors for inflation are applied and a projection is forecasted.  Any unforeseen event 
which may cause an extraordinary increase or decrease in actual funding is normalized to 
smooth the data for future forecasting. 
 One of the problems with CPFH determination deals with the consistency with 
matters of “conflicting data, computations, and priorities which should be addressed” 
(18:43).  Organizations use different databases, formulas, and priorities when calculating 
CPFH numbers.  Type Commanders must get their figures in line with the community 
sponsor or persuade the FHP office to change the way computations are made (18:45). 
Variances of ten arise between what is planned and what actually occurs.  A negative 
CPFH variance is often viewed as damaging to the organization.  At the unit level, the 
Type Commanders have developed factors influencing CPFH calculations.  Some of the 
major factors include: 
• Unit Location- “The operating environment of a squadron can have a significant 
effect on flying expenses” (18:46). 
 
• Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO)- Funding is approved on a yearly basis.  The 
operational tempo may vary extremely from year to year depending on the flow of 
operations (18:47). 
 
• Type of Flying- “Whereas the Training and Readiness Matrices provide guidance 
as to the number of flight hours each event requires, it does not specify the 
intensity of the evolution” (18:48). 
 
• Non-PMA and Support Flights- A portion of the missions flown do not count 
towards aircrew readiness.  These miscellaneous flight hours must be flown by 
the units (18:48). 
 
• Aircraft Maintenance Costs and Human Error- The cost of aircraft 
maintenance and repair is a core constituent in the CPFH equation.  The collection 
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and reporting of maintenance requests and data submissions is a tedious process.  
Human error is likely to occur at some point in the process (18:49-50). 
 
Army Flying Hour Program Methodology – Historical Problems 
 The Army’s flying hour program has been criticized in the past due to poor 
performance.  From fiscal years 1984 to 1988, the Army underflew its flying hour 
program by 35.6 percent, compared to an overflight by the Navy of 2.3 percent and 
underflight by the Air Force of 3.7 percent (19:3).  Even though the Army has an aircraft 
fleet larger than the Navy, and as large as the Air Force, it did not have the headquarters 
personnel in place to effectively manage its flying hour program (19:3).  The Navy and 
Air Force had at least six individuals committed to the program, while the Army 
dedicated only one (19:4).   
 The Army improved its execution rate in its flying hour program from 87.4 
percent in fiscal year 1986 to 98.2 percent in fiscal year 1988 (19:4).  Despite this 
positive trend, then Executive Secretary to the Defense Resources Board (Programming 
Phase) David C. Chu directed the Army to submit a report to the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense no later than 1 May 1989, outlining plans for improving the management and 
oversight of the Aviation Flying Hour Program (19:4).  There was still serious doubt in 
the DoD whether the Army’s procedures were strong enough to effectively plan and 
execute the flying hour program (19:4).   
 The under execution of the flying hour program can be traced to the different 
methodologies used to predict flying hour requirements for the different commands.  The 
methods used by unit, major command (MACOM), and Department of the Army levels 
were all different, leading to inaccurate and inflated requirements.  The inflated 
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requirements were difficult, sometimes impossible, for the Army units to attain.  This 
inability lead to the program being underflown.   
At the unit level, the methodology was people and event based (19:16).  A unit 
commander considered the number of aircrew personnel and aircraft assigned, mission 
support requirements, hours necessary for maintenance, and the status of aviation and 
supported unit training (19:12).  Training requirements were broken out to include: 
qualification training, refresher training, mission training and initial as well as refresher 
night vision goggle training (19:13).  The hours required for each type of training were 
multiplied by the number of personnel to come up with a total hourly requirement.  
Simulator time was deducted from this total to come up with a net total hourly 
requirement for training (19:13).  The second part of a unit’s flying hour program 
included unique mission support and operational requirements, such as: combat and 
combat support; executive and staff transport; aerial photography and mapping; research, 
development, test, and evaluation; aeromedical evacuation; and special missions unique 
to location and operation (19:13-14).  The commander also estimated how much training 
could be accomplished collectively, as well as the hours required for maintenance 
activities (19:14-15).  A model detailing the flying hour requirements for each helicopter 
in a unit was completed and forwarded to the MACOM responsible for funding allocation 
of the flying hour program.  It should be pointed out again that the unit level 
methodology was people and event based in order to properly compare it to the 
methodology of the Department of the Army, which will be explained later.   
The MACOM aviation officer relies on military judgment, expertise, and 
historical data to identify any deviations from what would be considered normal for a 
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particular unit (19:19).  The MACOM simply totaled requirements for all subordinate 
units and forwarded the data for all aircraft systems to the Department of the Army 
Headquarters for funding (19:19-20).   
The Department of the Army based predictions for the flying hour requirements 
on the assumption that for every airframe there is one and only one crew available to fly 
the aircraft (19:23).  The Department of the Army level was airframe based while the 
subordinate units, or actual users of the flying hours, was based on crews available and 
annual personnel turnover rates (19:23).  Typically, aviation units are undermanned, 
leading to an overstatement of requirements with the airframe based methodology 
(19:23).   
 As much as possible, Army headquarters rolled up all the MACOM requests for 
flying hour funding into the Army’s POM.  Since there were still concerns about the 
accuracy of the requests, the Army staff responsible for the flying hour program 
recomputed the data using an Air OPTEMPO rate (19:25).  This rate was an indicator that 
expressed flying hour requirements, resourcing levels, and execution in terms of flight 
per-crew per-month for rotary wing aircraft (19:25).  This rate was applied to the active 
component’s six combat commands (19:25).  For example, the Air OPTEMPO rate for 
fiscal year 89 was 15.0 hours (19:25).  For a unit with 21 aircraft assigned, the number of 
hours required for the year would be found by multiplying 15 hours by 21 aircraft by 12 
months to arrive an annual requirement (19:25).  Since the airframe based methodology 
assumes one aircrew per airframe, this lead to a requirement overstatement (19:26).  
After applying this procedure across the entire service, Army headquarters was seeking 
more hours than the individual units could fly (19:26).  This situation gave the impression 
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that the Army was either very inefficient in executing its flying hour program or very 
inaccurate at predicting requirements (19:26). 
 
Chapter Summary 
 In this chapter, we document the implications of O&S costs on the total life-cycle 
cost of weapon systems and how these costs are increasing from year to year.  The O&S 
regulations and instructions provided by the DoD are explained to show what the services 
are required to estimate and track in order to reduce the O&S costs associated with major 
acquisition programs, as well as systems currently in inventory.  Along with the 
establishment of the VAMOSC system for each service, these efforts were intended to 
allow more accurate estimates of O&S costs and better budgeting.  From the perspective 
of the Air Force and Navy, the efforts to develop predictive models for O&S costs have 
had mixed results.  Due to the size and complexity of O&S costs, it was determined that 
forecasting a small segment of these costs, the CPFH program, would be a better 
approach.  Some of the historical problems with the CPFH calculations for all services 
were detailed in this chapter to show differences that lead to inaccurate estimates.  From 
these studies, we will develop a simple forecasting model that can be used quickly and, 
most importantly, is easily explained. 
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III. Methodology  
 
 
Chapter Overview 
 This chapter provides an in-depth view of the methodology that will be applied in 
conducting the research of O&S costs for Air Force rotary winged aircraft. This chapter 
starts with a brief description of the AFTOC database and how data was collected for the 
empirical portion of this research.  Then the chapter focuses on the details of the 
empirical breakout of the current FY03 OSD/CAIG format for O&S data for each Air 
Force Major Command (MAJCOM) by helicopter type.  The next step is to compare the 
actual expenditures for CPFH to the budget submissions of each MAJCOM for each 
helicopter being studied.  Then the actual CPFH expenditures are analyzed, exploring 
different forecasting options to determine which option best fits each series of data.  After 
the best forecasting option is selected, the forecasted figures will be analyzed by 
comparing them with the actual expenditures.  The results of this comparison are then 
analyzed by comparing them to the results of the actual expenditures compared to the 
budget submissions.  The final step in this methodology is to apply the chosen forecasting 
method in developing a forecast for FY04 for each helicopter by MAJCOM. 
 
Database 
 
 As mentioned in Chapter I, the AFTOC database will be used to gather the 
necessary data for the empirical O&S cost breakout analysis.  The database includes all 
major Air Force systems.  AFTOC was developed to satisfy Congressional O&S 
reporting requirements and contains all unclassified operating and support costs 
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associated with a weapons system.  The data contained in the AFTOC database is a 
collection of data from various sources.  It contains actual expenditures from the 
Command On-line Accounting & Reporting System (COARS), fuel information from the 
Fuels Automated Management System (FAMS), and military personnel costs from the 
Military Personnel Data System E300Z report.  Flying hour data and aircraft inventory 
data is extracted from the Reliability and Maintainability Information System (REMIS).    
 The necessary data for the O&S cost analysis is accessed through the AFTOC’s 
Aircraft menu.  Upon selecting CAIG New from the list of options, the User is taken to a 
search page that allows one to tailor the information to specific needs.  From here drop 
down menus allow for the selection of the fiscal year of the data requested and the type of 
helicopter.  The Level 1 CAIG Data is then downloaded in the format shown in Table  
10.  
Table 10.  Level 1 CAIG Data 
 
 
CAIG CAIG Description ACC AETC AFRC ANG PACAF
1.0 Unit Personnel $64,598,964 $2,396,036 $26,548,595 $21,983,029 $14,600,701 
2.0 Unit Operations $10,574,936 $531,910 $3,707,830 $3,677,501 $2,799,767 
3.0 Maintenance $35,343,112 $11,442,069 $15,818,893 $11,024,078 $7,541,889 
4.0 Sustaining Support $4,241,899 $5,757 $1,438,623 $1,462,154 $62,411 
5.0 Continuing System 
Improvements
$968,379 
6.0 Indirect Support $11,424,934 $495,952 $5,826,519 $4,045,191 $1,780,029 
Ttl Total Expenditures $127,152,224 $14,871,724 $53,340,459 $42,191,953 $26,784,796 
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When this data is retrieved, the User is given the option to download the data in a 
spreadsheet format.  After selecting this option, the Level 1 CAIG Data and the necessary 
Cost per Operating Hour Data, as shown in Table 11 below, are both available in this 
format.   
Table 11.  Level 1 CAIG Data, Cost per Operating Hour 
 
 
This data was extracted from AFTOC for FY96-FY02 for each of the three helicopters 
being studied in order to create charts showing the costs as a percentage of the six CAIG 
cost categories for each fiscal year.     
 
Empirical O&S Breakout 
 
 The Level 1 CAIG Data is used for the empirical O&S breakout.  Each helicopter 
is evaluated from FY96- FY02 for each MAJCOM.  Line charts are created showing the 
percentage that each of the six CAIG O&S Cost categories contributes to the entire cost 
for each fiscal year.  An example of the charts is shown in Figure 14, which shows the 
empirical O&S breakout for the HH-60G in ACC.  The percentage that each of the six 
CAIG CAIG Description ACC AETC AFRC ANG PACAF
1.0 Unit Personnel $6,526 $586 $5,443 $5,290 $5,990 
2.0 Unit Operations $1,068 $130 $760 $885 $1,149 
3.0 Maintenance $3,570 $2,796 $3,243 $2,653 $3,094 
4.0 Sustaining Support $429 $1 $295 $352 $26 
5.0 Continuing System 
Improvements
$98 
6.0 Indirect Support $1,154 $121 $1,195 $973 $730 
Ttl Total Expenditures $12,845 $3,635 $10,937 $10,153 $10,988 
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categories contributes to O&S costs provides a means to compare the costs from year to 
year without the outside influence of inflation, because increases due to inflation will 
apply to all of the categories.  For each MAJCOM the percentage breakout for each fiscal 
year will be compared to one another to analyze any trends that might be present.   
Figure 14.  ACC HH-60G O&S COSTS 
Actual Cost Per Flying Hour Versus Budget Submissions 
 
 The Air Force budgets the CPFH by MAJCOM.  In this section the budget 
submissions of the CPFH of the helicopters for FY00-FY02 are evaluated for each 
MAJCOM by comparing them to the actual CPFH collected from the Government 
Accounting and Finance System (GAFS).  A percent of error will be calculated for each 
comparison to be made by using the following formula:  
actual budgeted−
actual
100⋅
   (1) 
Using the percent of error will also place emphasis on the fact of being over or under the 
budgeted CPFH.  This is important because it will show if a constant trend exists of either 
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over or under budgeting by a MAJCOM.  These errors will be summarized and then 
readdressed later when the forecasted CPFH is calculated and compared to the actual 
CPFH using the same formula.   
 
Forecasting Options 
 
 For each MAJCOM being analyzed, three different forecasting techniques are 
used to evaluate the CPFH data extracted from GAFS.  The three forecasting techniques 
being employed are a three-year moving average (MA3), the single exponential 
smoothing (SES) method, and the Holt’s linear method.  The MA3 uses the average of 
the past three observations to forecast for the current period.  The number of data points 
in each average remains constant and includes the most recent observations (22:142).  
The formula for an MA3 is: 
Ft 1+
1
3
t 2−
t
i
Yi∑
=
⋅
   (2) 
Where Ft+1is the current forecast, Yi is the ith observation, and t is the sequence order 
number of the observation before the current forecast.  This method was selected for use 
in this research mainly for its simplicity, it is very easy to use and explain.  The reason 
the order of the MA is three and not a higher order, such as five, which could possibly 
result in better forecasting, is due to the fact that the data series are so small and having a 
larger order would greatly restrict the number of figures forecasted.  The main problem 
with this forecasting technique is that it does not handle trends very well and can take 
several periods before the forecast can catch up to a level shift in the data (22:146).    
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The SES method uses the following formula to forecast for the next period: 
Ft 1+ Ft α Yt Ft−( )+   (3) 
Where, Ft is the most recent forecast, Ft+1is the current forecast, Yt is the most recent 
observation, and alpha is a weight value between 0 and 1.  The new forecast is essentially 
the previous forecast plus an adjustment for the error of the previous forecast.  The level 
of alpha dictates how much the previous forecast error is weighted, the weight of the 
previous error increases as alpha increases and becomes closer to 1.  The Solver function 
within excel will be used to find the optimal value for alpha for each SES forecast.  
Initialization of all of the SES forecasts will be done by using the first observed value as 
the first forecast, so that F1 = Y1, and then proceeding from that point using the equation 
for SES.  This forecasting technique was also selected for its simplicity of use and 
understanding.  This method is good because as each new forecast uses the error of the 
previous forecast it ends up using a weighted scheme that uses decreasing weights as the 
observations get older (22:147).  The downfall of this forecasting method is the same as 
the MA3 in that it doesn’t handle trends very well and it will trail any trend in the actual 
data (22:148). 
The Holt’s linear method uses the following three formulas to forecast for the 
next period:  
Lt α Yt 1 α−( ) Lt 1− bt 1−+( )+   (4) 
bt β Lt Lt 1−−( ) 1 β−( )bt 1−+      (5) 
Ft m+ Lt bt m+        (6) 
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Where Lt is an estimate of the level of the series at time t and bt is an estimate of the slope 
of the series at time t, alpha and beta are smoothing constraints between 0 and 1, Yt is the 
most recent observation, Lt-1 is the last smoothed value, bt-1 is trend of the previous 
period, and m is the number of periods ahead to be forecasted (22:158).  This method of 
forecasting was selected because unlike the previous two methods Holt’s can handle 
trends within the data (22:158).  This method is also useful because it can forecast more 
than one period ahead if needed.  One of the cons of this method is that it can take the 
forecast a long time to overcome the influence of a shift in the opposite direction of the 
overall trend of the data (22:161).  The main con of this method is the complexity 
involved in both using this method and explaining it to management that might not have a 
background in forecasting.       
 Four evaluation measures will be utilized for every forecast calculated.  They are: 
The Mean Error (ME), the Mean Absolute Error (MAE), the Mean Percent Error (MPE), 
and the Mean Absolute Percent Error (MAPE).  With all four of these evaluation 
measures it is favorable for the forecasting method to report the least amount of error 
possible.  The ME is simply the average of all of the error terms and uses the following 
formula: 
ME
1
n
1
n
t
et∑
=
⋅
   (7) 
Where et is error (observation – forecast), and n are the number of observations. 
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However, the ME is likely to be small since positive and negative errors tend to offset 
one another (22:43).  The MAE compensates for this bias by first taking the absolute 
value of each error term and then taking the average.  The formula for MAE is: 
MAE
1
n
1
n
t
et∑
=
⋅
   (8) 
The MPE is calculated by finding the percent of error for each term and then taking the 
average of those terms.  The formula for MPE is: 
MPE
1
n
1
n
t
PEt∑
=
⋅
   (9) 
Where PEt is the percentage error [(actual-forecast)/actual]*100. 
As with the ME, the MPE allows terms to offset one another.  The MAPE compensates 
for the bias of MPE by taking the absolute value of each percent of error and then taking 
the average.  The formula for MAPE is: 
MAPE
1
n
1
n
t
PEt∑
=
⋅
  (10) 
These four summary statistics measure the goodness of fit of the model to the historical 
data (22:45).  All four statistics will be evaluated as a whole because all of these 
measures together can tell a more complete story of goodness of fit than any one of them 
individually. 
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Actual Cost Per Flying Hour Versus the Forecast  
 After the forecast has been evaluated and the method of forecasting has been 
chosen for each time series being studied, the forecasted CPFH for FY00-FY02 will be 
compared to the actual CPFH using the following percent of error formula: 
actual forecasted−
actual
100⋅
  (11) 
These percent of errors will then be compared to the percent of errors computed when 
evaluating the accuracy of the budgeted CPFH. 
 
Forecasting For FY04 
 The final step of this research is to provide a forecast of the CPFH for FY04.  This 
will be accomplished upon the availability of the FY03 CPFH data.  The method chosen 
for each MAJCOM flying a particular helicopter in the Forecasting Options section is 
utilized to make the FY04 forecast.  The FY03 data points are added to each applicable 
time series, the alpha and beta will be recalculated using solver if applicable and then the 
forecast for FY04 CPFH is calculated.   
  
Chapter Summary 
 This chapter provided a roadmap for conducting the necessary research of this 
thesis.  The methodology was provided in a logical order in which the research will be 
conducted.  The figures provide insight into the AFTOC database and what to expect for 
the Empirical O&S Breakout section of Chapter IV.  The formulas and their descriptions 
provide an in-depth look at the statistics being used to evaluate not only the forecast, but 
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also the budget submissions of each MAJCOM.  Following the steps laid out in this 
chapter will provide answers to the research questions/objectives listed in Chapter I. 
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IV.  Results and Discussion 
 
 
Chapter Overview 
 This chapter provides the results of the analysis performed for each helicopter 
being studied.  The first helicopter examined was the MH-53J/M Pave Low III/IV.  It was 
analyzed using the methodology laid out in Chapter III before moving on to the next 
helicopter.  Then the chapter focuses on the UH-1N Helicopter, and ends with the last 
helicopter examined, the HH-60G Pave Hawk.     
 
MH-53J/M Pave Low III/IV 
 Before reporting on the analysis for this helicopter it is important to reiterate the 
point that the MH-53 is handled differently by the financial community than the other 
helicopters studied in this research.  The Air Force normally budgets and tracks CPFH by 
MAJCOM.  Two MAJCOMs currently fly this helicopter, Air Force Special Operations 
Command (AFSOC) and Air Education and Training Command (AETC).  However, the 
budgeting and subsequent CPFH reporting is completed by AFSOC and is not reported or 
tracked by separate MAJCOMs.  This unique situation can be simplified by analyzing the 
O&S data in total, which will avoid problems that can arise in AFTOC by allocating 
certain expenses based on percentage of flying hours. 
  Empirical O&S Breakout 
 The percentage breakout of historical cost by CAIG category for the MH-53 is 
typical.  Looking at the CAIG definitions of these categories one would expect the 
biggest portions of overall cost of a weapons system to come from Personnel, 
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Maintenance, and Indirect Support.  This is clearly the case with the MH-53 as can be 
seen in Figures 15 below. 
 
Figure 15.  MH-53J/M Total O&S Costs 
 Consistently, from FY96 through FY02, the largest cost categories are the ones 
mentioned above.  These three categories make up 85 to 94 percent of the total cost in 
each fiscal year.  The only year that stands out from the rest is FY98; Unit Personnel 
costs drop below 40 percent.  This is not due to the fact that the overall cost of Unit 
Personnel was lower than in previous years, in fact it was almost exactly the same 
amount as it was in FY97.  Unit Personnel costs dropped as a percentage of the whole in 
FY98 due to the fact that both Continuing System Improvements costs increased from 
$5.5M to $14.3M and Maintenance costs increased from $44.9M to $69.3M from FY97 
to FY98 while the Unit Personnel cost remained virtually unchanged.  I believe the main 
reason for these increases in Continuing System Improvements and Maintenance are 
because of the electronic upgrades that were installed in FY98.  These upgrades were 
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called the Interactive Defensive Avionics System/Multi-Mission Advanced Tactical 
Terminal (IDAS/MATT), which equipped the helicopter with color digital night-vision 
capability and provided a threat warning system upgrade. 
Actual CPFH vs. Budgeted Submissions 
The actual CPFH figures were compared to the budgeted submissions for the MH-
53J/M for FY00 to FY02 using the formula explained in Chapter III.  The results in table 
12 below show that the budgeted figures in FY00 and FY01 were within 11 percent of 
what the actual costs were.  However, in FY02 the reported budget submission was more 
than 25 percent higher than the actual CPFH in that year giving it a negative variance.    
Table 12.  MH-53J/M Budget Variances 
 
Forecasting Options 
            The first step of forecasting is to graph the data as in Figure 16. 
This graph shows the positive growth the Air Force has experienced with the 
 
CPFH of the MH-53J/M. 
Figure 16.  MH-53J/M Pave Low III/IV CPFH 
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It seems a reasonable assumption that forecasting techniques that do not handle such 
trends will perform poorly against forecasting techniques that do consider such trends.  
Of the three forecasting techniques evaluated, the Holt’s method proved to be the best 
method.  Table 13 below shows the evaluation measures that were calculated for the MH-
53 J/M. 
Table 13.  MH-53J/M Evaluation Measures 
 
Initially even the Holt’s measurements look high, but if the data series in Figure 16 is 
divided and evaluated from FY96 to FY99 and then evaluated from FY00 to FY03, it is 
obvious how stationary the data is in the first four years.  From one year to the next 
during this period the highest jump in CPFH is $350, this is small compared to the 
changes in the rest of the series.  In FY00 to FY02 the series has a very strong positive 
trend, the increases in CPFH in these fiscal years are $845, $539, and $1,872 
respectively.  From FY99 to FY02, there was almost a 100 percent increase in the CPFH 
for the MH-53J/M, from $3,410 to $6,666.     
Actual CPFH vs. Forecasted 
The forecasted CPFH were compared to the actual CPFH in the same manor and 
in the same FYs as the budgeted CPFH were earlier, this will provide a basis for 
comparison.  The forecasted variances are shown in Table 14.   
ME MAE MPE MAPE
MA3 1101.25000 1101.25000 19.87532 19.87532
SES 766.75000 861.25000 13.41062 16.18189
Holt's 502.88550 619.32966 8.61901 12.03379
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Table 14.  MH-53J/M Forecasted Variances 
 
The most obvious thing about these figures is that none of the variances are negative; this 
means that for these three years the forecasted CPFH never exceeded the actual CPFH.  
When comparing these figures to the budget variances in Table 12, the FY00 forecasted 
variance is higher than the budget variance, but in FY01 and FY02 the forecasted 
variances are better than the budget variances by 5 and 8 percent respectively.   
 Forecasting for FY04 
 The FY03 actual CPFH figure of $7,706 was added to this time series and then 
Solver was ran to ensure that the alpha and beta values used were optimized to allow 
Holt’s method to provide the best forecast possible for FY04.  The FY04 forecasted 
figure was $9,215, and the MAPE calculated was 9.63647.  By adding this single data 
point the MAPE improved by more than two percent.  
   
UH-1N Helicopter  
 The CPFH data of three MAJCOMs flying the UH-1N was analyzed and 
forecasted.  The first MAJCOM assessed was AETC, then the data from Air Mobility 
Command (AMC) was analyzed and forecasted, and finally Pacific Air Forces  
Command (PACAF) data was analyzed.  The entire analysis and forecasting 
methodology was completed for each MAJCOM to keep their data separate from the 
other MAJCOMs being studied. 
FY00 FY01 FY02
16.89777 5.423446 18.9769
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AETC – Empirical O&S Breakout   
Figure 17 shows the percentage of O&S cost by CAIG category for the UH-1N in 
AETC.   
Figure 17.  UH-1N AETC O&S Costs 
This chart shows that the main cost drivers of O&S cost in AETC for this weapons 
system are Unit Personnel and Maintenance, making up between 79 to 86 percent of the 
total cost.  The rest of the cost is absorbed in Unit Operations, Indirect Support, or 
Sustaining Support.  The chart also shows that the percentage of total cost of Continuing 
Systems Improvements is zero in all fiscal years.  The most likely reason for this cost 
category to have nothing reported could be that all of the modifications taking place to 
the UH-1N were part of the pre-planned product improvement program placed on 
contract during the initial acquisition of the system.  If this were the case then those costs 
would not be accounted for in Continuing Systems Improvements. 
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AETC – Actual CPFH vs. Budgeted Submissions  
 Table 15 below shows the UH-1N budget variances for AETC.  In FY00 the 
variance is negative meaning that the budgeted figure was more than the actual in that 
year; but the budgeted figure was within 10 percent of the actual CPFH.  The only 
variance beyond the acceptable range in this table is the high variance in FY01, because 
the variance for FY02 shows that the budgeted and actual CPFH cost were almost the 
same. 
Table 15.  AETC UH-1N Budget Variances 
     
AETC – Forecasting Options 
 The time series for AETC in Figure 18 appears unstable, but when the scale is 
taken into consideration it is a lot better than initially thought.  Except for the FY96 
CPFH figure, almost all of the changes in the series are approximately 10 to 15 percent.   
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Figure 18.  UH-1N AETC CPFH 
FY00 FY01 FY02
-7.27848 20.02762 0.86741
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Of the three forecasting techniques evaluated, Holt’s easily outperformed the other two 
methodologies.  The summary statistics for this time series are shown in Table 16 below. 
 Table 16.  AETC UH-1N Evaluation Measures 
 
Both the MAE and the MAPE for the Holt’s forecast were twice as good as the MAE and 
MAPE for the other two forecasts.   
AETC – Actual CPFH vs. Forecasted 
The variances for the forecasted figures for AETC are summarized in Table 17. 
Table 17.  AETC UH-1N Forecasted Variances 
   
These variances are all within 10 percent of the actual CPFH figure, and show that the 
Holt’s forecast was a good fit for this data.  Compared to the budget variances in Table 
15, the FY00 forecasted variance is slightly higher, but the variance is positive, meaning 
that the forecasted figure was less than the actual CPFH.  The FY01 forecasted variance 
is more than twice as good as the budget variance, and in FY02 the forecasted figure was 
almost equal to the actual CPFH figure. 
 AETC – Forecasting for FY04 
 The FY03 actual CPFH figure of $853 was added to this time series and then 
solver was ran to ensure that the alpha and beta values used were optimized to allow 
Holt’s method to provide the best forecast possible for FY04.  The FY04 forecasted 
figure was $912, and the MAPE calculated was 4.67774.  When this data point was added 
FY00 FY01 FY02
10.12658 7.734807 -0.12392
ME MAE MPE MAPE
MA3 37.39417 110.49083 3.43172 16.11947
SES 43.16040 78.05040 5.22008 11.27611
Holt's 29.77480 30.13770 4.43836 4.48334
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the MAPE increased two-tenths of a percent.  The next MAJCOM to be analyzed and 
forecasted for the UH-1N is AMC. 
AMC – Empirical O&S Breakout 
 Figure 19 shows the empirical breakout of the CAIG O&S cost categories for 
AMC. 
Figure 19.  UH-1N AMC O&S Costs 
The most notable difference between this chart and the other empirical charts is the high 
percentage of total O&S cost that is attributed to Sustaining Support within AMC.  The 
first explanation of this could be that these costs have been captured in the wrong 
category, but this could also be the product of the way in which AMC conducts business.  
The large percentage of Sustaining Support could be due to the fact that AMC is 
capturing the reimbursements for the use of their assets by other units in this category.  
All of the other cost categories seem consistent to one another in their changes from year 
to year, except Continuing Systems Improvements, which is again zero in all years. 
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 AMC – Actual CPFH vs. Budgeted Submissions 
 The budget variances of AMC for the UH-1N are shown in Table 18 below.  They 
show that in FY00 the actual CPFH figure was higher than the budgeted figure in that 
year giving it a variance that is just outside of the desired 10 percent goal.  That year is 
followed by the FY01 variance that is more favorable, but in FY02 the budgeted figure is 
more than 25 percent less than the actual CPFH. 
Table 18.  AMC UH-1N Budget Variances 
 
 AMC – Forecasting Options 
 The time series for AMC in Figure 20 looks very stable from FY96 to FY01 with 
just a slight positive trend.  However, in FY02 the stability of this time series is weakened 
when the CPFH cost increases by almost 60 percent over the previous year.  This large 
increase, from $546 to $866 per flying hour, explains why the budget variance is so high 
for FY02, and will also prove more difficult to forecast accurately.  
FY00 FY01 FY02
13.24627 -2.74725 25.17321
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Figure 20.  UH-1N AMC CPFH 
The best forecasting method for this time series was again Holt’s method, however this 
could possibly change with the addition of the FY03 CPFH figure.  The summary 
statistics for AMC are listed in Table 19 below.  
Table 19.  AMC UH-1N Evaluation Measures 
 
The Holt’s statistics are good, especially considering that 85 to 95 percent of these error 
terms are attributed to error terms for FY02 in which the 60 percent increase in cost 
occurred.  This also explains the high forecasting variance in this same year. 
 AMC – Actual CPFH vs. Forecasted 
 The forecasted variances for AMC are given in Table 20.  They are what should 
be expected when trying to forecast for this time series. 
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Table 20.  AMC UH-1N Forecasted Variances 
 
The FY00 and FY01 forecasted variances are almost nonexistent because there is very 
little change in the data during these years and the error is very small.  The FY02 
variance is extremely high, however, this does not mean that the forecasting of FY04 will 
hold to this same pattern.  It does mean that more work will have to be done once the 
FY03 actual CPFH figure is added to this series.  It will not just be a matter of adding the 
FY03 figure and then forecasting for FY04.  Once the figure is added all three forecasting 
options will be reevaluated to determine the best method in forecasting for FY04. 
 AMC – Forecasting for FY04 
 The FY03 actual CPFH figure of $782 was added to this time series and then 
solver was ran to ensure that the alpha and beta values used were optimized to allow 
Holt’s method to provide the best forecast possible for FY04.  The FY04 forecasted 
figure was $796, and the MAPE calculated was 9.18981.  By adding this single data point 
the MAPE improved by 1.5 percent.  This section ends with the final UH-1N MAJCOM 
analyzed and forecasted for, PACAF. 
 PACAF – Empirical O&S Breakout 
 The empirical O&S breakout in Figure 21 below shows that every cost category 
appears stable from FY96 to FY00 as a percentage of the total O&S cost.  It appears that 
Unit Personnel costs increase dramatically starting in FY01, but it actually only increased 
slightly in total cost.  The main cause of this percentage increase to Unit Personnel is that 
Unit Operations had decreased in total cost and Maintenance costs experienced a slight 
FY00 FY01 FY02
-0.74627 -0.73260 35.33487
 80
decline in costs.  This causes Unit Personnel to make a much larger percentage of the 
smaller total cost in FY01 and FY02.    
Figure 21.  UH-1N PACAF O&S Costs 
In FY96 the Unit Personnel, Unit Operations, and Maintenance cost categories make up 
80 percent of the total cost.  In FY97 to FY02 these same categories make up 96 to 97 
percent of the total cost.  Again, with the UH-1N, this time in PACAF, we see that the 
total value for Continuing System Improvements from FY96 to FY02 is zero. 
 PACAF – Actual CPFH vs. Budgeted Submissions  
 Table 21 shows the budget variances for the UH-1N in PACAF.  These figures 
start in FY00 with a large negative variance.  Then in FY01 the negative variance is just 
within 10 percent of the actual CPFH.  The final variance in FY02 shifts in the opposite 
direction and becomes an extremely large positive variance. 
Table 21.  PACAF UH-1N Budget Variances 
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The reason for these questionable variances, as well as very similar forecasted variances, 
will become clearer as the time series is evaluated in the next section. 
 PACAF – Forecasting Options 
 Figure 22 shows how volatile the CPFH time series is for PACAF.  There is a 
steep positive upward trend from FY96 to FY98 in which the CPFH figure grows about 
60 percent.  Then there is a large negative trend from FY98 to FY00 in which a 55 
percent decrease is experienced.  From FY99 to FY01 the data seems to be more stable, 
until the 65 percent increase from FY01 to FY02. 
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Figure 22.  UH-1N PACAF CPFH 
 Because this time series deals with multiple drastic trends, Holt’s method will 
generally not do a very good job of forecasting for it.  This was definitely the case here 
and the SES method was chosen having the best evaluation statistics of all three methods.  
The summary statistics for the SES method in Table 22 are good considering the time 
series from which they were taken.  The fluctuation between the ME and the MAE, and 
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between the MPE and the MAPE are due negative errors off setting positive errors in 
both the calculations for the ME and MPE.   
Table 22.  PACAF UH-1N Evaluation Measures 
 
Taking the absolute value of the errors before calculating the MAE and MAPE combats 
these cancellations of errors. 
 PACAF – Actual CPFH vs. Forecasted 
 Table 23 below lists the forecast variances for PACAF.  These figures show that 
in FY00 the negative forecast variance is almost exactly the same as the budget variance 
from Table 24.  The FY01 forecast variance is good, but this mainly has to do with the 
fact that the data is stable from FY99 to FY01.  Looking at FY02 and we see a forecast 
variance that is even higher than the large budget variance in the same year.  This again 
will call for more forecasting work to be accomplished as the FY03 CPFH is added to 
this time series to ensure that the best forecast is made for FY04. 
Table 23.  PACAF UH-1N Forecasted Variances 
 
This positive forecast variance in FY02 is exactly what one would expect to see after 
looking at the time series in Figure 22.  
 PACAF – Forecasting for FY04 
 The FY03 actual CPFH figure of $794 was added to this time series and then 
solver was ran to ensure that the alpha value used was optimized to allow the SES 
FY00 FY01 FY02
-14.7392 -0.6135 39.15737
ME MAE MPE MAPE
MA3 24.06417 139.70750 -2.33573 22.63892
SES 62.08510 95.69620 5.98381 13.57675
Holt's -38.80783 173.31283 -13.58446 30.25939
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method to provide the best forecast possible for FY04.  The FY04 forecasted figure was 
$616, and the MAPE calculated was 16.66245.  By adding this single data point the 
MAPE increased by 3 percent, but this is understandable looking back at the plot of 
actual CPFH data in Figure 22.  If the FY03 data point were added to the graph it would 
be clear that the series would experience another direction change in the trend.  The 
analysis will now switch to the final Air Force helicopter being evaluated and forecasted 
for, the HH-60G.   
HH-60G Pave Hawk 
 The CPFH data of four MAJCOMs flying the HH-60G was analyzed and 
forecasted in this section.  The first MAJCOM assessed was AETC, and then the data 
from Air Combat Command (ACC) was analyzed and forecasted.  This was followed by 
analyzing and forecasting for the Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) and then the last 
MAJCOM to be evaluated will be Pacific Air Forces Command (PACAF). 
 AETC – Empirical O&S Breakout  
 The empirical O&S breakout for AETC in Figure 23 shows that Maintenance 
costs is the biggest driver for this MAJCOM. One explanation could be that a large 
portion of the Maintenance cost in AETC is due to contractor maintenance that is 
properly captured in this cost category.  For FY96 through FY02 Maintenance and Unit 
Personnel account for 77 to 93 percent of the total O&S cost. 
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Figure 23.  HH-60G AETC O&S Costs 
    
 AETC – Actual CPFH vs. Budgeted Submissions 
 The budget variances for FY00 to FY02 are listed in Table 24 below.  The 
variances for FY00 and FY02 are both within 4 percent of the actual CPFH figures in 
those years, the only downfall that they might have is that both variances are negative 
which means that AETC over-budgeted in both these years.  The FY01 variance on the 
other hand is very high; the budgeted figure was more than 25 percent less than the actual 
CPFH.  
Table 24.  AETC HH-60G Budget Variances 
 
 AETC – Forecasting Options 
 The CPFH data for FY96 to FY00 in Figure 24 below shows a stable data set 
from FY96 to FY99 with a slight negative trend from FY97 to FY99.  Then from FY99 to 
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FY02 the data has a sharp positive trend.  During this three-year period the CPFH rose 
nearly 54 percent from $1,044 to $1,602 
Figure 24.  HH-60G AETC CPFH 
Holt’s method was selected as the best forecasting method for this time series.  The 
summary statistics for AETC are in Table 25 below.  The Holt’s method statistics are 
very low and provide credit to how well the Holt’s method forecasted this data set. 
Table 25.  AETC HH-60G Evaluation Measures 
 
 AETC – Actual CPFH vs. Forecasted 
 The forecasted variances in Table 26 below are what one would expect after 
looking at the plot of the data in Figure 24 and using Holt’s method.  The variance in 
FY00 is not within the desired range, but it is understandable when one looks at how the 
data jumped in FY00 after a three year negative trend.  Taking that into consideration, the 
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next variance is small, especially when compared to the budget variance for the same 
year (see, Table 24).  The forecasted variance in FY02 is a little misleading, the 
forecasted figure was not the exact same as the actual CPFH for that year, it was off by 
82 cents.   
Table 26.  AETC HH-60G Forecasted Variances 
 
 AETC – Forecasting for FY04 
 The FY03 actual CPFH figure of $2,420 was added to this time series and then 
solver was ran to ensure that the alpha and beta values used were optimized to allow 
Holt’s method to provide the best forecast possible for FY04.  The FY04 forecasted 
figure was $2,6191,234, and the MAPE calculated was 11.49583.  By adding this single 
data point the MAPE increased by 4.5 percent.  The next MAJCOM that will be 
evaluated and forecasted for is ACC.    
  
 ACC – Empirical O&S Breakout  
 The empirical O&S breakout for ACC in Figure 25 is more status quo than the 
empirical O&S breakout from AETC in Figure 23.  Here, Unit Personnel is the dominant 
cost category in each fiscal year.  All cost categories are populated for the first time in 
this particular area of the research.  Once again, Unit Personnel, Maintenance, and the 
Indirect Support cost categories account for 85 to 90 percent of the total cost. 
FY00 FY01 FY02
23.41062 -4.11241 0
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Figure 25.  HH-60G ACC O&S Costs 
 ACC – Actual CPFH vs. Budgeted Submissions 
 The budget variances for the HH-60G for ACC are presented in Table 27 below.  
One immediate point to be made is that all three variances are negative, meaning that the 
budgeted CPFH figure was larger than the actual CPFH figure in all three years.  The 
variances for both FY00 and FY01 are very favorable, however, the FY02 variance is the 
highest variance experienced in this research.   
Table 27.  ACC HH-60G Budget Variances 
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ACC – Forecasting Options 
 The CPFH time series for ACC in Figure 26 below shows that the series is very 
stable from FY97 to FY00, experiencing a slight positive trend from FY98 to FY00.  
Then in FY01 the trend switches directions and is 25 percent less than the FY00 CPFH 
figure.  This negative trend then continues in FY02. 
Figure 26.  HH-60G ACC CPFH 
Holt’s method was the best of the three methods at forecasting for this time series.  The 
evaluation measures can be seen in Table 28 below.  Although this series of data 
experiences many directional changes, the MPE and the MAPE for the Holt’s method are 
very low.  Most of the error present in the MAPE, 86 percent of it, is accounted for 
because of the change in direction of the trend in FY01. 
Table 28.  ACC HH-60G Evaluation Measures 
$0.00
$500.00
$1,000.00
$1,500.00
$2,000.00
$2,500.00
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
ACC HH-60G Actual
CPFH
ME MAE MPE MAPE
MA3 -54.29583 262.56250 -4.44217 14.17511
SES 150.59526 240.11025 6.37107 11.83727
Holt's -110.94330 166.50355 -6.33662 8.93591
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ACC – Actual CPFH vs. Forecasted 
 The forecasted variances in Table 29 are also victim of the shift that occurred in 
the series in FY01.  However, the variance for FY00 is les than 3 percent and the 
variance for FY02 is zero because Holt’s method was able to forecast the actual CPFH.  
There is no room for improvement for the FY02 forecasted variance of zero, and 
comparing it to the budgeted variance of -68.254 from Table 27 lends credit to how 
powerful a tool these forecasting techniques can be.   
Table 29.  ACC HH-60G Forecasted Variances 
   
 ACC – Forecasting for FY04 
 The FY03 actual CPFH figure of $3,440 was added to this time series and then 
solver was ran to ensure that the alpha and beta values used were optimized to allow 
Holt’s method to provide the best forecast possible for FY04.  The FY04 forecasted 
figure was $4,234 and the MAPE calculated was 18.61453.  This MAPE increased by 9.7 
percent, and is almost unacceptable.  However, the increase in MAPE can be directly 
attributed to the 3-year negative trend that precedes this 48 percent increase in CPFH.  
The next MAJCOM that will be evaluated and forecasted for is AFRC. 
 AFRC – Empirical O&S Breakout  
 The empirical O&S breakout for AFRC in Figure 27 below is very similar to what 
was seen with ACC in Figure 25.  Consistently from FY96 to FY02, Unit Personnel is the 
largest cost category representing 49 to 60 percent of the total cost.  The top three cost 
FY00 FY01 FY02
2.701486 -30.5449 0
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categories are Unit Personnel, Maintenance, and Indirect Support.  These three cost 
categories account for 90 to 93 percent of the total O&S cost in each fiscal year.     
Figure 27.  HH-60G AFRC O&S Costs 
 AFRC – Actual CPFH vs. Budgeted Submissions 
 The budget variances for AFRC in Table 30 start with a low variance in FY00.  
This is followed by a variance just over 10 percent in FY01, and then in FY02 the 
variance is unacceptably greater than 20 percent.  It is hard to explain the large positive 
variance in FY02, especially with the negative variances from FY00 and FY01, and the 
fact that those negative variances increase from FY00 to FY01.  The reason for this large 
variance will become a little clearer as the time series is explored in the next section. 
Table 30.  AFRC HH-60G Budget Variances 
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 AFRC – Forecasting Options 
 Figure 28 below shows the time series of CPFH for AFRC.  The series is stable in 
FY96 to FY99 with a positive trend.  From FY99 to FY01 the data remains virtually 
constant.  This period of almost no change is then followed by a sharp change in FY02 
where the CPFH increased by over 50 percent from the previous year. 
Figure 28.  HH-60G AFRC CPFH 
The increase in CPFH in FY02 is responsible for the large budget variance in Table 30, 
and was also the culprit causing the error measurements in Table 31 below to be a bit 
higher than expected.  Holt’s method was the best forecasting method for this time series 
with a MAPE that is just slightly above 11 percent.  The large increase in FY02 accounts 
for almost 75 percent of the error reported in the MAPE. 
Table 31.  AFRC HH-60G Evaluation Measures 
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 AFRC – Actual CPFH vs. Forecasted 
 The forecasted variances in Table 32 below are very similar to the budget 
variances of Table 30.  Both tables show acceptable negative variances in FY00 and 
FY01 and then report a very large positive variance in FY02.  The large forecasted 
variance in FY02 means that as the FY03 CPFH figure is added to the series the 
forecasted methods will be reevaluated to ensure the best forecast is made for FY04.   
 
Table 32.  AFRC HH-60G Forecasted Variances 
  
 AFRC – Forecasting for FY04 
 The FY03 actual CPFH figure of $3,777 was added to this time series and then 
solver was ran to ensure that the alpha and beta values used were optimized to allow 
Holt’s method to provide the best forecast possible for FY04.  The FY04 forecasted 
figure was $5,126, and the MAPE calculated was 12.61557.  By adding this single data 
point the MAPE increased by 1 percent.  The final MAJCOM evaluated and forecasted 
for was PACAF. 
  
 PACAF – Empirical O&S Breakout 
 
 The empirical O&S breakout for PACAF, Figure 29 below, is almost identical to 
both ACC and AFRC.  Once again Unit Personnel is the biggest cost category for every 
fiscal year, accounting for 49 to 56 percent of the total cost.  In PACAF the top three cost 
drivers were Unit Personnel, Maintenance, and Unit Operations, which account for 93 to 
FY00 FY01 FY02
-9.36914 -2.04969 33.05682
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94 percent of the total cost in each year.  This graph is the most stable O&S breakout that 
has been analyzed; the percentages from FY96 to FY02 remain very constant.   
Figure 29.  HH-60G PACAF O&S Costs 
 PACAF – Actual CPFH vs. Budgeted Submissions 
 The budget variances for PACAF are in Table 33 below.  In all fiscal years the 
variances are positive.  The variance in FY00 is favorable, as well as the variance for 
FY02.  However, the variance in FY01 is extremely high, the budgeted figure was more 
than 37 percent lower than the actual CPFH figure in that year.   
Table 33.  PACAF HH-60G Budget Variances 
 
 PACAF – Forecasting Options 
 The time series for PACAF is below in Figure 30.  The data is stable from FY96 
to FY00; during this period the fluctuation from year to year is never more than $300.  
Then the data experiences a positive shift of about 30 percent in FY01 and maintains this 
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same CPFH level in FY02.  This shift in FY01 explains why the budget variance in Table 
33 above is so high. 
Figure 30.  HH-60G PACAF CPFH 
The best forecasting method for this time series was SES.  Table 34 lists the 
evaluation measurements for PACAF.  The MAPE for the SES forecast is just slightly 
above 12 percent.  It is important to note that 50 percent of the error reported in the 
MAPE comes from the forecasted CPFH in FY01 when the large increase noted earlier 
takes place.  Because the MAPE calculated for each forecast is so similar, the forecasting 
method used will be reevaluated when the FY03 CPFH figure is added to the time series. 
Table 34.  PACAF HH-60G Evaluation Measures 
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PACAF – Actual CPFH vs. Forecasted 
 The forecasted variances for PACAF are in Table 35 below.  They show a 
variance in FY00 that is almost 12 percent.  The variance in FY01 is very large, but is 
smaller than the budget variance in FY02 from Table 33.   The large discrepancy in both 
the budget variance and forecast variance in FY01 is due to the large increase to the 
CPFH in that FY.  The variance in FY02 is zero for the SES method because this method 
correctly forecasted the FY02 CPFH figure to the penny. 
Table 35.  PACAF HH-60G Forecasted Variances 
  
 PACAF – Forecasting for FY04 
 The FY03 actual CPFH figure of $3,150 was added to this time series.  Because 
the evaluation measures in Table 34 were so similar the forecasting methods were 
reevaluated to provide the best forecast possible for FY04.  When this was accomplished 
Holt’s method outperformed the other methods.  The FY04 forecasted figure was $3,410, 
and the MAPE calculated was 11.49909.  By adding this single data point and switching 
forecasting methods, the MAPE improved by 1 percent.   
 
Chapter Summary 
 This chapter analyzed and forecasted costs for the three helicopters in the Air 
Force inventory.  The analysis of each MAJCOM started with an empirical study of the 
CAIG O&S costs breakout in order to identify the main cost drivers.  Budget variances 
were calculated and evaluated for each MAJCOM.  Then, forecasting options for each 
time series were evaluated to ensure that the best methodology was chosen to forecast the 
FY00 FY01 FY02
11.9191 24.21466 0
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series.  Of the methods evaluated, Holt’s method was chosen for six of the series and SES 
was chosen for two.  After the forecasting was accomplished, forecasting variances were 
calculated and evaluated for each MAJCOM.  These forecasted variances were compared 
to the budget variances calculated earlier.  In 5 of the 8 MAJCOMs the forecasted 
variance was better than the budget variance.  In those three MAJCOMs where the 
budget variance was better, both the variances were above 20 percent.  In all three of 
these MAJCOMs the forecasting methodology was reevaluated prior to performing the 
final step of the research, forecasting for FY04.  For all of the time series FY03 figures 
were added, then the forecasts for FY04 were made and the evaluation statistics were 
recalculated.  
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V. Conclusion  
 
 
Problem Revisited 
 Operating and Support costs constitute the majority of the total life cycle cost for 
Air Force weapons systems.  The first step in being able to control these costs is to 
understand the elements that comprise these costs and the proportion each element 
contributes to the total cost.  The understanding of the nature of these costs will lead to 
more accurate budget submissions and better fiscal responsibility.  The discrepancy 
between budget submissions and actual expenditures for CPFH programs lends itself to 
the need for the research conducted within this thesis.  The primary objective of this 
research was to provide OSD/CAIG with a useful tool to forecast CPFH for Air Force 
rotary aircraft.  These forecasts would then be used by the OSD/CAIG to analyze both the 
budget submissions of the Air Force and the independent cost estimates of the 
OSD/CAIG. 
 
Limitations 
 
 As useful a tool that was developed in this research it does need routine 
maintenance and call for additional analysis as new data is added.  The forecasts that 
were developed for each MAJCOM cannot simply be extended as the next fiscal year’s 
data becomes available.  In order to be consistent with the methodology used and 
described in Chapter III in providing the most accurate forecast possible for the fiscal 
year in question; as data is added to each time series the applicable alpha and beta levels 
of each forecast must be recalculated.  After this is accomplished all three forecasting 
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methods can be extended one period and then reevaluated using the four-evaluation 
measure also described in Chapter III.  Also, as new data becomes available it will be 
necessary to evaluate the time series to ensure that all of the data being used is still 
relevant when forecasting for the next period.  It is possible that a change in CPFH 
reporting procedures could produce a cost level shift that could cause prior years data to 
become irrelevant when trying to predict the future costs. 
 
Summary of Literature Review 
 
 The literature review starts by explaining how O&S costs have become an 
important issue within the DoD and then describes the initiatives of the DoD to control 
these costs.  The rest of the literature review is broken down into two major categories: 
Major O&S Guidance, and Past Research.  The Major O&S Guidance section gives an 
overview of Title 10 that establishes the legal requirement for O&S cost estimating and 
reporting.  This section also provides an overview of the DoD directives and guidance 
that tailor the O&S cost estimating and reporting to the specific needs of the DoD.  This 
section continues by explaining the establishment of both the VAMOSC and AFTOC 
systems, and then ends with a brief summary of the three helicopters being studied.  The 
Past Research section includes the details and results of four other theses and four 
professional reports that directly relate to the material of this research.  This section 
contains studies of CPFH and O&S cost reduction from the Army, Navy, and the Air 
Force.  Although none of the literature of this section is an exact match of the research of 
this thesis, it does provide a solid background and show the necessity of the research 
contained within this thesis.    
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Review of the Methodology 
 
 The methodology of this research starts with a description of the AFTOC database 
and the necessary steps to extract the data from it for the empirical O&S breakout portion 
of the research.  The methodology also describes the formulas used to evaluate the actual 
CPFH against the budget submissions for FY00-FY02, and the actual CPFH against the 
forecasted figures for FY00-FY02.  The methodology thoroughly describes each of the 
three forecasting methods being employed within this research and provides in depth 
detail of the four evaluation measures being utilized to determine the overall best 
forecasting method for each time series.  The methodology concludes with an explanation 
of forecasting for FY04, which is the final step of the research conducted.      
 
Restatement of Results 
 
 The analysis performed for the MH-53 J/M Pave Low was very encouraging.   
The empirical O&S breakout analysis depicted results that were very consistent from 
FY96 to FY02 with Personnel, Maintenance, and Indirect Support comprising 85 to 94 
percent of the total cost in each year.  The forecasting method used provided very good 
evaluation measures, which reported a MAPE of 12.03379.  The forecasted variances for 
FY01 and FY02 proved to be far superior when compared to the budget variances in the 
same years.    
The analysis for the UH-1N Helicopter started with AETC.  The empirical O&S 
breakout analysis showed some volatility between Indirect Support and Unit Operation, 
but combined the categories accounted for less than 20 percent of the total cost for any 
year.   The main cost drivers for AETC were Unit Personnel and Maintenance, which 
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combined for 80 percent of the total O&S cost.  The evaluation measures for AETC were 
the lowest of all of the time series analyzed with a MAPE of 4.48334.  Again the 
forecasted variances calculated were far better than the budget variances for FY01 and 
FY02. 
The next MAJCOM analyzed for the UH-1N was AMC.  The empirical O&S 
breakout analysis yielded results very unique when compared to the rest of the 
MAJCOMs for the UH-1N, however, upon further investigation it was discovered that 
the results were almost identical to other platforms within AMC.  The most noticeable 
difference was that the largest cost driver in all years, FY96 to FY02, was Sustaining 
Support, which made up between 40 to 78 percent of the total cost.  The evaluation 
measures for this time series were very good, but highly influenced by the 60 percent 
increase to the CPFH from FY01 to FY02.  This large increase also affected the forecast 
for FY02 in which there was a very poor forecasted variance, however, the forecasted 
variances for FY00 and FY01 were both less than 1 percent. 
The last MAJCOM analyzed for the UH-1N was PACAF.  The empirical O&S 
breakout analysis shows a lot of volatility between Maintenance, Unit Personnel, and 
Unit Operations for FY96 to FY00, but these cost categories made up 96 to 97 percent of 
the total cost in FY97 to FY02.  The CPFH data for PACAF was very unstable with two 
changes in trend direction from FY96 to FY02.  The evaluation measures achieved were 
reasonable, with a MAPE of 13.57675, considering the CPFH actuals being forecasted.  
Even though the forecasted variance for FY01 was less than 1 percent, the 65 percent 
increase in actual CPFH from FY01 to FY02 caused both the budget variance and the 
forecasted variance to reach unacceptable levels above 30 percent. 
 101
The analysis for the HH-60G Pave Hawk starts with AETC.  The empirical O&S 
breakout analysis showed that 77 to 93 percent of the total cost in each year from FY96 
to FY02 consisted of Maintenance and Unit Personnel.  The CPFH data for AETC has a 
very dominant and stable positive trend, this stability allows the forecasting technique to 
provide some of the lowest evaluation measures of this research anchored by a MAPE of 
6.90956.  The forecasted variances of -4.11241 percent for FY01 and 0 percent for FY02 
were a vast improvement when compared to the budget variances for the same years. 
The next MAJCOM analyzed for the HH-60G was ACC.  The empirical O&S 
breakout analysis was stable for FY96 to FY02 in which Unit Personnel, Maintenance, 
and Indirect Support comprised 85 to 90 percent of the total cost.  The evaluation 
measures achieved for this data were very good with a MAPE of 8.93591.  When 
comparing the forecasted variances to the budget variance, FY02 tells a very convincing 
story for the forecasting methodology.  In FY02 the budget variance was –68.254 percent 
and the forecasted variance was 0 percent. 
 AFRC was the next MAJCOM analyzed for the HH-60G.  The empirical O&S 
breakout analysis for AFRC was also stable in all years examined.  The top three cost 
categories were Unit Personnel, Maintenance, and Indirect Support, which together 
accounted for 90 to 93 percent of the total O&S cost in each year.  The evaluation 
measures for this time series were acceptable.  The MAPE was 11.13373 with 75 percent 
of the error reported being directly contributed from the 50 percent increase in CPFH 
from FY01 to FY02.  Although the forecasting technique used was able to improve the 
FY01 forecasted variance by 8.5 percent when compared to the budget variance, the 50 
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percent increase in CPFH from FY01 to FY02 caused both the FY02 budget and 
forecasted variances to be unacceptable. 
 The last MAJCOM analyzed for the HH-60G was PACAF.  The empirical O&S 
breakout analysis for the HH-60G was more stable when compared to the O&S breakout 
for PACAF with the UH-1N.  Each cost category for the HH-60G changed less than 8 
percent from one year to the next.  Unit Personnel, Maintenance, and Unit Operations 
accounted for 93 to 94 percent of the total cost in each year.  The evaluation measures for 
this time series were acceptable, and anchored by a MAPE of 12.39074.  For FY01 and 
FY02 the forecasted variances were an improvement over the budget variances, and again 
the forecasted variance for FY02 was 0 percent because the forecasted figure matched the 
actual CPFH figure. 
 
Recommendations  
 The forecasting techniques used in this research proved to be very powerful in 
predicting future CPFH figures.  The methodology and results of this research provides 
the OSD/CAIG with a valuable tool that aids in O&S cost estimating and oversight 
functions.  This same benefit might also be achieved if this research methodology were 
applied to other Air Force platforms.  This methodology could also be tailored and 
applied as a budgeting tool.  There could possibly be situations where the Air Force Cost 
Analysis Agency, as well as financial managers within system program offices and local 
budget offices, could employ forecasting techniques because the benefit of performing 
such analysis could be an improvement over current methods used.   
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Possible Follow-on Theses 
 The research of this thesis only touches a very small portion of several important 
and interesting topics.  There are many more areas the Air Force could employ 
forecasting, and the efforts to realize O&S cost savings will be addressed for a long time.  
This research has shed light on other research opportunities.  Here are some suggestions: 
• Apply this same analysis and forecasting methodology to other Air Force 
platforms, such as: fighter, bomber, or cargo aircraft. 
 
• Explore other forecasting techniques that could be used to determine CPFH 
factors for Air Force aircraft. 
 
• Analyze the method used to allocate costs within the AFTOC database. 
 
• Repeat this research on the same helicopters as FY04-FY06 data becomes 
available. 
 
• Analyze the CPFH figures forecasted for FY04 to the actual CPFH for FY04 and 
determine reasons for any disconnects that are present. 
 
• Determine useful applications of forecasting techniques in budgeting for other 
Air Force costs. 
 
• Create a program that will apply the methodology of this thesis to a time series to 
forecast other CPFH factors. 
 
• Explore the effects of deployments on total O&S costs. 
 
• Analyze the different methodologies used by each service in determining CPFH 
factors and determine if better methods are available.  
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